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Why the Corporation Locks in
Financial Capital but the Partnership
Does Not
Richard Squire *
Each partner in an at-will partnership can obtain a cash payout of his
interest at any time. The corporation, by contrast, locks in shareholder capital,
denying general payout rights to shareholders unless the charter states
otherwise. What explains this difference? This Article argues that partner
payout rights reduce the costs of two other characteristics of the partnership: the
non-transferability of partner control rights, and the possibility for
partnerships to be formed inadvertently. While these characteristics serve
valuable functions, they can introduce a bilateral-monopoly problem and a
special freezeout hazard unless each partner can force the firm to cash out his
interest. The corporation lacks these characteristics: shares are freely
transferable, and no one can commit capital to a corporation without intending
to do so. Therefore, in most corporations the costs of shareholder payout rights—
which would include the cash-raising burden and a hazard of appraisal
arbitrage—would exceed the benefits.
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INTRODUCTION

In her celebrated article Locking in Capital: What Corporate
Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century,
Margaret Blair drew the attention of scholars to one of the distinctive
attributes of the corporate form: that it locks in capital, denying each
shareholder the power to obtain a payout of his investment without the
consent of the board of directors. 1 By locking in shareholder capital, the
corporate form creates a freezeout hazard if the board refuses to
authorize distributions and the shareholders cannot find buyers for
their shares. 2 However, Blair emphasized that capital lock-in can also
provide an important economic benefit. Expanding upon a thesis
introduced by Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 3 she showed
that capital lock-in protects the corporation’s going-concern value. 4 In
particular, she argued, it provides this benefit by preventing
shareholders from withdrawing assets with firm-specific value. 5
The idea that a business can protect its going-concern value by
organizing as a corporation has proven to be highly influential. Besides
expanding scholars’ understanding of the economic functions served by
the corporation in particular, it has led some scholars to inquire
1.
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003).
2.
Id. at 388:
The phrase “lock-in,” when used in the context of corporate law, generally has a
negative meaning, suggesting the dreaded fate of a minority shareholder in a closely
held corporation who cannot sell her shares . . . and cannot compel the corporation to
pay out any of its income or assets to shareholders.
3.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 403–04 (2000) (describing how “liquidation protection” in the corporation preserves
going-concern value).
4.
Blair, supra note 1, at 391–92.
5.
Id. at 393–94.
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whether the partnership, the traditional organizational alternative to
the corporation, might also protect going-concern value, albeit by
different means. Unlike the corporation, the partnership does not lock
in financial capital: the default rule is that any partner may withdraw
at any time and thereupon receive a payout of his interest in the
business. However, in an innovative recent article, Morgan Ricks
showed that partnership law employs a pair of rules that safeguard
firm-specific assets when a partner exercises his payout right. 6 Both
rules were developed by courts in the nineteenth century, and both
remain in effect today. The first rule is that a departing partner must
be paid out in cash unless all the partners agree to an in-kind
distribution of the partnership’s property instead. 7 And the second rule
is that, if a partner withdraws, any partner may demand an auction of
the whole firm, intact. 8 The winner of the auction—which will often be
the non-withdrawing partners—can then continue to operate the firm
without interruption. As described by Ricks, these features of
partnership law preserve the underlying business’s particular “asset
configuration,” which includes its holdings of complementary assets. 9
Besides its asset configuration, a second potential source of a
business’s going-concern value is its contractual relationships. A firm
can use contracts to capture the surplus from relationship-specific
investments and to lock in favorable supply prices. I show in this Article
that partnership law also protects this source of going-concern value
when a partner withdraws. 10 Even though the default rule is that a
partner’s withdrawal dissolves the partnership and leads to its
termination, courts have, since the nineteenth century, consistently
held that the partnership’s contracts remain enforceable, by and
against the partners jointly, unless the contracts say otherwise. As a
result, one partner cannot hold up the others to the extent of the value
of the firm’s profitable contracts by threatening to pull out. In
combination with the rules preserving the partnership’s asset
configuration, this contract-survival rule locks in the partnership’s real
capital—its investments in specialized assets and valuable
contractual relationships—even while permitting withdrawals of
financial capital. 11
6.
Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment Device, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1309,
1336 (2017).
7.
Id. at 1337.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 1336.
10. See the discussion in Section I.D.3, infra.
11. Ricks described the distinction in this way:
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The recent recognition among scholars that the partnership also
employs methods for safeguarding going-concern value further confirms
the insight provided by Hansmann, Kraakman, and Blair that the
protection of such value is one of the core functions of the law of
business organizations in the modern economy. An analogy can be made
to the development of writing, arguably the most important invention
of ancient civilizations. Writing is a technology so useful that it was
independently invented at least four times on three different
continents. 12 Although the four resulting systems of writing employed
different scripts and operated in different ways, they all served the
same essential function. Similarly, preserving a firm’s going-concern
value is such a valuable function of organizational law that corporate
law and partnership law each developed its own legal mechanism for
serving that function. In the corporation, the mechanism is its
straightforward lock-in feature, whereby the board rather than
shareholders decides when capital will be distributed. In the
partnership, the mechanism is the set of rules that permit a departing
partner to withdraw his financial capital without also breaking up the
business’s real capital.
Of course, the fact that partnership law has developed rules for
shielding the principal components of going-concern value when a
partner withdraws does not mean that the partner’s exercise of his
payout right is costless. Most obviously, the exercise of the right forces
the partnership to come up with the cash needed to honor the right.
And, perhaps more importantly, it requires resort to an independent
valuation method when the partners disagree about how much the
departing partner’s interest in the firm is worth. The two main
valuation options are sale of the whole firm—the traditional method in
partnership law—and appraisal by a third party such as a judge or
arbitrator. 13 Both methods have downsides: they generate transaction
[Margaret] Blair argues convincingly that the corporate form became popular among
business organizers in the nineteenth century largely because the corporate form, as
compared to the (readily dissolvable) partnership, offered a superior means to lock in
financial capital. In essence, my claim is that the traditional partnership did in fact
offer capital lock-in—albeit lock-in of a comparatively weak form when judged against
the corporation.
Ricks, supra note 6, at 1308–09.
12. See Stephen Chrisomalis, The Origins and Co-Evolution of Literacy and Numeracy, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF LITERACY 59, 62 (Nancy Torrance & David R. Olson eds., 2009). In
order, those places were Mesopotamia (circa 3400 B.C.), Egypt (circa 3250 B.C.), China (1200 B.C.),
and Mesoamerica (by 500 B.C.). Id. at 63, 64, 66.
13. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 (“RUPA”) provides for third-party appraisal
rather than sale of the whole firm when a partner dissociates from the partnership not through
intentional withdrawal but rather on account of death or personal bankruptcy. REVISED UNIF.
P’SHIP ACT § 701(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997).
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costs, introduce misvaluation risk, and invite opportunism, the form of
which depends on the method employed. These various drawbacks of
payout rights suggest the following question: Why does partnership law
continue to grant such rights by default rule, rather than simply locking
in financial capital as the corporation does?
In this Article, I propose an answer to this question. I argue that
payout rights for partners complement two other characteristics of the
partnership: its restriction on transfers of partner control rights; and
the possibility for partnerships to be formed inadvertently, without
each partner’s intention to convey his property to a distinct legal entity.
Although these two characteristics serve important functions in the
partnership, they also introduce a bilateral-monopoly problem and a
heightened freezeout hazard if each partner cannot withdraw and
obtain a cash payout of his interest at any time.
The rule that no partner may transfer his control rights without
permission from all the others is a corollary of the principle that no
person may join a partnership without all partners’ consent. That
principle makes sense given that any partner can use partnership
property, bind the partnership in contract, and incur tort liabilities for
which all partners are liable. However, if partners lacked payout rights,
then the principle would produce a bilateral-monopoly problem
whenever a partner wished to exit, since the other partners are,
collectively, the only possible buyers of his control rights. 14 The other
partners could simply stonewall the exiting partner, perhaps out of
spite (after all, he wants to leave them). Or, even if they were willing to
negotiate, the haggling could be protracted because neither side would
face competition from other possible buyers or sellers. The payout right
breaks the deadlock: it forces the non-withdrawing partners to come to
the bargaining table, and it simplifies negotiations by shrinking the
bargaining space to the positive difference, if any, between the
departing partner’s estimate of the price that a sale of the firm would
assign to his interest and the remaining partners’ estimate of that price.
The rule whereby co-owners of a business can be deemed to have
formed a partnership even if they did not intend that result also serves
a valuable function, as it forces co-owners of a business to bear the costs
of injuries caused by persons acting on their behalf, and it prevents
unjust enrichment of some owners at the expense of others. But the rule
would be unduly harsh if the resulting partnership locked in the
14. Notice that the default rule prevents the remaining partners from competing against each
other to buy the departing partner’s control rights, as they all must consent to any transfer of those
rights.
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owners’ capital, because a coalition of owners that controlled this
partnership could then freeze out the others. By granting payout rights
as a default rule, partnership law ensures that business owners assume
freezeout risk only when they have consented to do so, such as by
agreeing to a partnership for a term or by conveying their property to
what they know to be a distinct legal entity.
The corporation lacks both of these attributes of the partnership.
All rights appurtenant to share ownership—comprising both cash-flow
rights and control rights—are freely transferable along with the shares
themselves, a benefit of incorporation that corporate law makes
possible by assigning management powers and agency authority to the
board of directors, and by limiting control by shareholders to the
election of directors and ratification of certain board-initiated
transactions. In consequence, when a shareholder wishes to exit, his
fellow shareholders (or, acting on their behalf, the corporation itself) are
not the only possible buyers of his full bundle of rights. In addition, a
corporation cannot be formed unintentionally, and no investor can
commit his capital to a corporation without intending to do so. Wouldbe shareholders are thus on notice of the freezeout hazard presented by
the corporate form and can adjust for it in the price they pay for their
shares or by insisting on payout rights as a condition of the purchase.
Not only would payout rights not serve the same special
purposes in the corporation that they serve in the partnership, but they
would also be costlier. Because corporate shares are, by default rule,
freely transferable, they would create an onerous hold-up hazard if they
came with payout rights. Investors could then buy shares for the sole
purpose of threatening to force the corporation to buy the shares back,
which would require the corporation not just to come up with the needed
cash but also to employ an independent valuation method that could
overvalue the shares or force a change in control, depending on the
method used. Therefore, in most corporations the costs of shareholder
payout rights would greatly exceed the benefits. The contrast between
the partnership and corporation in this regard suggests that payout
rights and free transferability of equity interests are mutually
incompatible sources of liquidity for a firm’s investors. Many firms will
grant one or the other, but almost none will allow both.
After presenting my arguments with respect to the corporation
and the traditional partnership, in the second Part of this Article I
assess the capital lock-in rules in the three limited-liability alternatives
to the corporation now available to business organizers: the limited
partnership, the limited liability company (“LLC”), and the limited
liability partnership (“LLP”). Notably, all three of these forms of
business organization are like the partnership in that they restrict
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transfers of owner control rights. But they are also like the corporation
in that they cannot be formed without the formality of a public filing.
They therefore allow us to investigate whether restrictions on transfers
of owner control rights are alone sufficient to make owner payout rights
a desirable organizational feature, even in entities that cannot be
formed inadvertently.
Notably, when each of these three limited-liability alternatives
to the corporation first appeared in American law, its governing
statutes typically—that is, in most jurisdictions—provided for owner
payout rights. This observation suggests that the statutory drafters
believed that a prohibition on unilateral transfers of owner control
rights was sufficient to make payout rights the preferred default setting
for the majority of businesses that would adopt the form as their
organizational dress. However, with the introduction of the latest of the
three forms—the LLP—in the 1990s, the field of substantially similar
business forms had become crowded, creating a need for differentiation.
Accordingly, in the last twenty years, numerous states have eliminated
the payout right as the default setting in the limited partnership and
LLC while retaining it in the LLP. In effect, the drafters of the latest
statutes governing the limited partnership and LLC have supplied new
majoritarian default rules tailored not to the full set of businesses that
wish to organize as a limited-liability alternative to the corporation, but
rather to the subset of those businesses that do not, for whatever
reason, also prefer the default rules of the LLP. Such changes have
increased the likelihood that the founders of any particular business
will be able to select an entity form whose organizational default
settings, including those regarding lock-in of financial capital, coincide
with the founders’ preferences.
I. CAPITAL LOCK-IN AND GOING-CONCERN VALUE
A business’s going-concern value can have multiple components,
and rules that circumscribe capital withdrawals by owners protect
those components in different ways. In the discussion that follows, I
describe the main components of going-concern value, and I then
evaluate the scholarly literature on capital lock-in by analyzing how,
and to what extent, the corporation and partnership protect each of
those components.
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A. The Pieces of Going-Concern Value
When scholars or financial analysts discuss a firm’s “goingconcern value,” they typically have in mind the present value of the firm
if it is allowed to continue in its current state, without interruption of
its operations. Going-concern value is usefully contrasted with
“liquidation value,” which is the theoretical amount of cash that would
be raised if a firm were shut down and its assets sold off piecemeal at
prices reflecting those assets’ best alternative uses. Because the firm’s
liquidation value could, in theory, be realized at any time by shutting
down the firm, it represents the opportunity cost of allowing the firm to
continue to operate. If a firm’s going-concern value exceeds its
liquidation value, then the firm generates a “going-concern surplus,”
and the incurring of this opportunity cost is economically justified. 15
Otherwise, the firm’s assets have superior alternative uses, and
economic value could be realized by liquidating it.
This comparison between going-concern value and liquidation
value implies two cases in which economic value is squandered. The
first occurs when a firm’s liquidation value exceeds its going-concern
value—that is, it has a going-concern deficit—but its managers decide
to keep it running anyway, presumably to hold onto their jobs. In that
case, the managers have put their interests ahead of the owners’
interests. The second case occurs when the firm has a going-concern
surplus but it is nonetheless forced to liquidate. Wasteful liquidation
could occur because the firm is insolvent and its creditors, knowing that
there is not enough value to satisfy all of their claims in full, race
against each other to pull the firm apart. Or it could occur because an
owner demands a payout of his interest and liquidation is the legal or
practical consequence. It is this last possibility that has concerned
scholars who have written about capital lock-in.
Of course, if a firm with a going-concern surplus were forced to
liquidate, the first choice of the buyers of its assets would not be to put
those assets to their best alternative uses. Rather, they would want to
reassemble the firm, since it was already putting its assets to their best
(most profitable) use. But even if a firm with a going-concern surplus
could be reassembled after liquidation, some value would be lost in the
interim. Most obviously, piecemeal liquidation followed by reassembly
would interrupt the firm’s operations. A firm will find it difficult to
conduct its business while its property undergoes legal (if not physical)
15. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2330 (2005) (defining “going-concern surplus” as the
excess of a firm’s value in its current asset configuration over the amount that would be obtained
if the firm were shut down and its assets sold off).

2021]

WHY THE CORPORATION LOCKS IN FINANCIAL CAPITAL
BUT THE PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT

1795

fragmentation. As a result, the firm will suffer a temporary loss of
operating profits, which will reduce its net present value. 16 And the
bidders on the firm’s various assets will factor in this temporary loss of
operating profits when calculating how much they can pay for those
assets and still expect to realize an adequate return on their
investments. The assets’ combined sales price will therefore be lower
than it would be if the assets were sold in a manner that avoided any
disruption of operations.
A second potential source of value loss in piecemeal liquidation
occurs when a firm has multiple assets with firm-specific value and
those assets are acquired by different buyers. An asset has firm-specific
value if it is unique and its optimal use requires coordination with other
unique assets that the firm owns. 17 Liquidating a firm with firm-specific
assets can produce a bilateral-monopoly problem, which arises when
there is only one potential buyer and one potential seller of a good
or service. 18
As an illustration of this possibility, imagine an automaker that
owns two unique assets: a trademark for a particular model of car and
a robot specially designed to assemble that model. We will assume that
rebuilding the robot for use on a different car model would be expensive,
perhaps prohibitively so. The robot thus has considerable value when
used in conjunction with the trademark but little value (perhaps only
scrap value) when used otherwise. If the automaker were forced to
liquidate, the trademark and robot would ideally be bundled and sold
together in a single auction lot, as their combined value is greater than
the sum of their values in separate hands. But if for some reason this
option were unavailable, then the assets might end up with different
new owners. Those new owners would naturally want to reunite the
assets, such as by having the one who now owns the robot sell it to the
one who now owns the trademark. But the parties would find
themselves in a situation of bilateral monopoly, which as characterized
by Black’s Law Dictionary creates “transactional delays” because
“either party can hold out for a better deal without fearing that the
other party will turn to a third party.” 19 And the anticipation of such
transactional delays will reduce the prices that the two assets fetch at
their separate auctions, because their would-be buyers will, when
16. To see the point mathematically, imagine the impact on a discounted cash-flow analysis
of a firm if the operating profits for the first period, representing the time needed to disassemble
and then reassemble the firm, were deleted.
17. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 392; Ricks, supra note 6, at 1347.
18. Bilateral Monopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
19. Id.
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calculating their expected returns on their investments, factor in the
profits that will be foregone while the assets are separated.
In addition to uninterrupted operations and coordination
between firm-specific assets, another potential contributor to a firm’s
going-concern surplus is its contractual relationships. Liquidation could
threaten a firm’s contracts if, as in many bankruptcy proceedings, it
results in the dissolution and termination of the legal entity that serves
as a party to those contracts. Two types of valuable contract might then
be imperiled. The first consists of contracts that capture the value of
relationship-specific investments. As an illustration, imagine that our
hypothetical automaker does not own the specialized robot mentioned
before but rather leases it from its manufacturer. To preserve the value
of its investment in the robot, its manufacturer would prefer a lease
with a long term, ensuring ongoing joint production and a mutually
agreeable division of the resultant surplus. If, however, the robot
manufacturer were forced to liquidate in bankruptcy, and in
consequence the legal entity housing it dissolved, the lease might
terminate because one party to it would have ceased to exist. To be sure,
the robot would probably be purchased from the manufacturer’s estate
by a new owner, who would then seek to enter into a new lease with the
automaker. 20 But because we would again have a bilateral monopoly
(the new owner is the only possible lessor of the robot, and the
automaker is the only possible lessee), negotiations over the lease price
might be protracted, with an associated loss of economic profits. 21
The second type of contract that might contribute to goingconcern value is a long-term supply contract that is “in the money.” As
an illustration, imagine that our hypothetical automaker wishes to lock
in its price for aluminum and thus enters into a ten-year contract to buy
aluminum at regular intervals at a fixed price. If during the life of the
contract the market price of aluminum were to rise above this fixed
20. Ideally, the automaker would buy the robot at this point. But it might be cash-constrained,
which could explain why it was leasing the robot in the first place.
21. Relationship-specific investment could also increase the value of a supplier of labor, i.e.,
a worker. Such investment could take the form of training that enables the worker to operate a
unique piece of machinery owned by his employer. After the training, the worker could hold up the
employer by demanding a higher wage, seeking to capture the full benefit of the training for
himself. See Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 9 (1962). To prevent this, the employer could agree to pay for the training only if the worker
enters into a long-term employment contract that locks in a wage rate. If the training is industryspecific but not firm-specific, then the employer might also wish to include a noncompete clause,
because judges will not order specific performance of an employment contract against a worker
who wishes to quit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 367 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A promise
to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.”).
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price, the contract would then be “in the money” from the perspective of
the automaker, whose profits would be greater than they would be if it
had to buy aluminum on the spot market. But such profits would be
forfeited if dissolution of the legal entity housing the automaker
effected the contract’s cancellation. In this way, in-the-money supply
contracts can contribute to a firm’s going-concern value. To be sure, our
hypothetical automaker might also have out-of-the-money supply
contracts that it would be happy to be able to tear up, in which case
cancellation on account of dissolution would destroy value for
its counterparties.
It is notable that bankruptcy law provides a mechanism for
preserving certain contracts that contribute to the debtor’s goingconcern value. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee 22 appointed to
manage a debtor’s estate can (with the permission of the court)
selectively assume some of the debtor’s executory contracts and
unexpired leases while rejecting others. 23 The trustee will normally
employ this power to assume only those contracts and leases that are
in the money. 24 Moreover, even if the debtor cannot continue to perform
its end of the bargain, the trustee can assume an executory contract or
lease and then assign it—for a fee, naturally—to a third party. 25
Notably, the trustee has the power to assume an executory contract or
lease even if it contains an “ipso facto” clause providing for its
termination upon the debtor’s bankruptcy. 26 Contractual prohibitions
on assignment are similarly unenforceable, with state contract law
giving way to federal law. 27 By these means, bankruptcy law seeks to
preserve the value the debtor derives from certain of its profitable
contracts even when the parties have bargained for something else.
To summarize, we can say that liquidation can destroy a firm’s
going-concern value by two main mechanisms. First, it can disrupt
operations, including by interrupting coordination of firm-specific
assets. And second, it can deprive the firm of value from profitable longterm contracts. With these mechanisms of value destruction in mind,
we now consider the prior scholarly literature on the question whether,
22. If the case proceeds under Chapter 11, contemplating reorganization of the debtor rather
than liquidation, the debtor’s managers will serve in lieu of the trustee, acting on behalf of the
“debtor in possession” of its own estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1107.
23. Id. § 365(a).
24. Rejection gives the counterparty a damages claim for breach, but the claim is treated as
if it arose before the bankruptcy filing and therefore will typically be worth, on account of the
debtor’s insolvency, only a fraction of its face value. Id. § 365(g)(1).
25. Id. § 365(f)(1).
26. Id. § 365(e).
27. Id. § 365(f)(1).
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and to what degree, the corporation and the partnership preserve goingconcern value when equity investors wish to pull out.
B. The Lock-in Literature
The first important scholarly work to suggest that legal entities
play a role in preserving going-concern value in business firms was
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s groundbreaking 2000
article The Essential Role of Organizational Law. 28 The article argues
that the essential role of business entities such as corporations and
partnerships is to introduce a legal partition between a firm’s assets
and the personal debts of its owners. 29 Such partitioning is “essential”
because many firms would find it prohibitively expensive to achieve by
contract alone. 30 Both the partnership and the corporation serve this
partitioning role by granting the firm’s creditors the first claim to the
firm’s assets, thereby denying personal creditors any recovery from
those assets unless the firm’s debts have first been paid in full. 31 In
addition, the corporation (and other “strong-form” entities) goes a step
further by adding a rule of “liquidation protection,” which disables each
of a firm’s owners and his personal creditors from unilaterally
withdrawing his share of the firm’s assets. 32 Without such liquidation
protection, each owner and his personal creditors could effectively
demand piecemeal liquidation or division of the firm’s assets, which
would imperil going-concern value. 33
The next key paper on the subject of business entities and goingconcern value was Margaret Blair’s seminal 2003 article on capital lockin. 34 The article’s thesis is that “demand for the corporate form surged
in the mid-nineteenth century United States because this form
uniquely facilitated the establishment of lasting enterprises that could
accumulate substantial enterprise-specific physical assets, and form
extensive specialized organizational structures.” 35 This thesis can be
understood as comprising two distinct claims. The first is an historical
claim, namely that the corporation’s strong rule of capital lock-in made
the corporate form especially useful to modern industrial firms. And the
second is an economic claim: that capital lock-in protects a specific
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 407–12.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 394, 434–35.
Id. at 403–04.
Blair, supra note 1.
Id. at 413.
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component of going-concern value—namely, value from firm-specific (or
“enterprise-specific”) assets. 36 As described by Blair, a business owner
could hold up his co-owners if he enjoyed the power to order a general
division of the firm’s assets or demand the return of a firm-specific asset
he had contributed to it. 37 By locking in capital, the corporation denies
such powers to shareholders (and their successors, such as heirs). 38
In 2006, Hansmann and Kraakman—now joined by me as their
coauthor—published the article Law and the Rise of the Firm, which
describes the historical development of asset partitioning in business
organizations. 39 Because the article considers a broad swath of
economic and legal history, spanning from ancient Rome to the modern
United States, by necessity it offers a less-detailed analysis of the
Industrial Revolution than Blair provided in Locking in Capital. Its
thesis regarding that period is nonetheless consistent with Blair’s, as it
emphasizes the role played by “strong entity shielding”—which includes
liquidation protection—in making the corporate form attractive to large
American businesses during the nineteenth century. 40 Once again, the
primary economic function of liquidation protection is identified as
going-concern protection, with associated benefits in terms of scale
economies that are realized when a firm can bring on new investors
without concern that they or their personal creditors will use
withdrawal threats to hold up the firm. 41
The idea that the corporation’s strong rule of capital lock-in
protects going-concern value has been widely accepted and cited. At the
same time, it has led some scholars to question whether the business
corporation was—at the time of its emergence in the nineteenth
century—unique in protecting such value, or unique only in its means
for doing so. 42 One such scholar was Larry Ribstein, a national expert
36. Id. at 402.
37. Id. at 401–02.
38. “Lock in” as used by Blair and “liquidation protection” as used by Hansmann and
Kraakman are largely synonymous, as both refer to rules preventing owners and their personal
creditors from withdrawing assets representing the owner’s equity interest in the firm. See Blair,
supra note 1, at 389; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 434. Blair, supra note 1, at 392,
also used “lock in” to refer to withdrawal restrictions on the heirs of owners, whom Hansmann and
Kraakman did not separately address, implicitly grouping them with personal creditors.
39. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006).
40. Id. at 1394.
41. Id. at 1349 n.38.
42. In addition to the articles by Ribstein and Ricks discussed below, another important
article in this category is by John Morley, who showed that business organizers historically had
another limited-liability option available to them: the business trust. John Morley, The CommonLaw Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
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on partnership law. In his 2005 article Why Corporations?, 43 Ribstein
noted that partners have always been able to suspend their payout
rights by agreeing to a partnership for a term or a specific
undertaking. 44 Although drafting around a default rule entails expense,
Ribstein observed that “lawyers have considerable experience with
continuation agreements in partnerships.” 45 Ribstein further argued
that partnerships also enjoy protection against heirs, as the
partnership agreement can provide for cash payouts over time of the
interests of retiring or deceased partners, and a partner’s heirs have no
interest in specific partnership property. 46
More recently, Morgan Ricks has shown that partnership law
employs mechanisms for locking in specialized assets even when the
partners have not agreed to suspend their individual payout rights. In
his innovative 2017 article Organizational Law as Commitment
Device, 47 Ricks identified another “essential” function of entity law: to
permit “property relinquishment,” whereby a firm’s owners surrender
any property interests they might hold in specific business assets, in
exchange for which they receive an interest in the firm’s
undifferentiated assets as a whole. 48 As described by Ricks, property
relinquishment “practically eliminates the ability of co-owners (and
their successors/heirs) to defect with individual business assets.” 49
Property relinquishment is clearly a feature of the business
corporation, which has always been recognized as a legal entity distinct
from its shareholders. In other words, it is well established that the
corporation, not its shareholders, owns the property of the underlying
2145 (2016). Morley argued that, by the nineteenth century if not before, business organizers could
achieve most of the features of a corporation—including limited liability, entity shielding, tradable
shares, and capital lock-in—by use of a trust, which held the property of a partnership or other
unincorporated business association. The arrangement evidently fell into disuse by the early
twentieth century, supplanted by the corporation. Id. at 2179.
43. Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183 (2005).
44. Id. at 194. The point had been acknowledged by Hansmann and Kraakman, whose
argument was that organizational law was needed to make such an agreement binding on the
partners’ personal creditors. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 412. It had also been
acknowledged by Blair, who further noted that a common-law partnership, even if for a term or a
specific undertaking, would nonetheless automatically dissolve if “a partner died, became insane,
or went bankrupt.” Blair, supra note 1, at 410.
45. Ribstein, supra note 43, at 194.
46. Id. at 194–95. Hansmann and Kraakman recognized that partnership law had developed
some common-law mechanisms for providing liquidation protection. In particular, they noted that
“courts are sensitive to the desirability of preserving going-concern value, and for this reason will
generally decree foreclosure on an interest in a partnership [on behalf of a partner’s personal
creditor] only as a last resort.” Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 404 n.25.
47. Ricks, supra note 6.
48. Id. at 1351.
49. Id. at 1306.
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business. But Ricks showed that property relinquishment is also an
attribute of the common-law partnership and indeed has been so since
at least the nineteenth century, even though partnerships were not
then considered distinct legal entities. 50 Therefore, courts have
consistently held that a withdrawing partner enjoys no power to
demand a partitioning or piecemeal liquidation of partnership
property. 51 Rather, nineteenth-century courts ruled that dissolution of
a partnership upon a partner’s withdrawal gave each partner the right
to demand a sale of the whole firm, intact and without interruption of
its operations. 52 As described by Ricks, “the partnership was ‘dissolved’
in such cases, but the business continued.” 53 The rule remains in force
today. 54 Moreover, if a partner died or became a debtor in bankruptcy,
nineteenth-century courts held that the rights of his heirs or creditors
were no greater than his own: they could seek a sale of the whole firm
followed by a cash payout but not a division of its assets. 55 The benefits
of such a “forced sale” are conspicuous, as the sale both assigns a value
to the departing partner’s interest and raises the cash needed to pay it
out. 56 But Ricks also emphasized that, in combination with the cashonly payout rule, the forced-sale option preserves the underlying
business’s particular asset configuration when it is worth preserving. 57
In reviewing the literature to date on the relationship between
business entities and going-concern value, we see that each article
either treats going-concern value as a uniform concept (Hansmann and
50. Id. at 1327–28. Partnership law achieves property relinquishment through three
features: the “disgorgement” feature, whereby a partnership can recover all profits from a
productive asset that one partner has diverted from the business; the “in rem” feature, whereby a
knowing purchaser of a partnership asset that was sold to him without partnership authorization
may use it only for partnership purposes; and the “title consolidation” feature, whereby partners
surrender their claims to specific partnership assets not only for the life of the partnership but
also through dissolution, so that none can force a partitioning and in-kind distribution of the assets
upon the partnership’s termination. Id. at 1331–38.
51. Id. at 1308.
52. Id. at 1337–38.
53. Id.
54. CHRISTINE HURT, D. GORDON SMITH, ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.11[B] (2d ed. 2019).
55. Id.
56. In upholding a partner’s right to insist upon a sale and cash payouts of partner interests
upon his partnership’s dissolution, the Wisconsin court in the seminal case of Dreifuerst v.
Dreifuerst cited both of these functions, as well the proposition that the partnership assets might
be worth more intact than separated. 280 N.W.2d 335, 338–39 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that
“the assets of the partnership as a whole may be worth more than the assets once divided up,” and
that a sale is the best way to determine the “true fair market value of the assets”).
57. “[T]raditional partnership law allowed venturers to commit to more durable asset
configurations than would have been possible (or would today be possible) through contracting
alone, thereby supporting the creation of going-concern value.” Ricks, supra note 6, at 1308.
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Kraakman, Ribstein) or addresses just one component of such value,
effectively equating it with going-concern value in toto (Blair, who
focused on firm-specific assets, and Ricks, who similarly focused on the
partnership’s particular asset configuration). The authors’ choices in
this regard are understandable, as their respective theses required that
they devote the space available to them to detailed analyses of the legal
and economic structure of business entities and, in several articles, to
legal history. The authors thus implicitly left to future scholarship the
task of expanding upon their analyses by considering whether, and by
what mechanisms, the corporation and the partnership protect each of
the distinct components of going-concern value, which—as I have
described—include uninterrupted operations, assets with firm-specific
value, and profitable contracts. I take up that task here, beginning with
the corporation.
C. Going-Concern Value and the Corporation
Unless the charter provides otherwise, a corporation’s capital is
entrusted to the board of directors, and shareholders have no power to
insist upon its return. The board enjoys the exclusive power to declare
dividends, normally payable only to the extent that the firm has a
surplus. And a shareholder’s capital—reflecting the full value of the
shareholder’s equity interest in the corporation—can normally be
returned to him only in one of three ways: a share buyback, the exercise
of appraisal rights in connection with a merger, or dissolution of the
corporation itself. Each such action must be initiated by the board (and
then ratified, in the case of dissolution and some mergers, by holders of
a majority of shares). 58 Thus, the corporation really does lock in capital,
and the board holds the key.
Of the three methods for returning capital to shareholders, only
dissolution could, in theory, present a substantial threat to each of the
components of going-concern value. Dissolution followed by termination
would normally cancel the corporation’s contracts because the
corporation as party to those contracts would no longer exist. And
dissolution might disrupt the firm’s operations and fragment its asset
holdings, unless—as is often the case—it is the last step in a transaction
whereby the corporation sells its business intact and distributes the
proceeds to the shareholders.
In practice, however, there is no reason for a board of directors
to authorize dissolution of their corporation while it has a going-concern
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 251, 273 (2021) (covering share buybacks,
mergers, and dissolutions, respectively).
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surplus. This is true regardless of whether the directors are dedicated
to serving shareholder interests or just their own. If they are loyal to
the shareholders, they will avoid value-destroying dissolution, which by
definition injures the shareholders collectively. And if they are loyal
only to themselves, they will avoid dissolution regardless of whether the
corporation has a going-concern surplus, simply to preserve their
positions. Indeed, as noted previously, the real hazard is not that the
directors will authorize dissolution when the firm has a going-concern
surplus, but rather that they will fail to initiate dissolution when the
firm has a going-concern deficit, a situation in which their personal
interests directly oppose those of the shareholders.
Share buybacks, by contrast, are the capital-return method that
presents the least threat to going-concern value, both theoretically and
in practice. Buybacks do not cancel the corporation’s contracts (unless
for some reason the contracts say they do), nor is there any reason they
should disrupt its operations. In theory, the directors could authorize a
distribution of real assets rather than cash to purchase shares, but it is
hard to see why they would want to do so, especially if the assets have
firm-specific value, as the directors would then harm shareholders
collectively while imperiling the firm they presumably enjoy directing.
For these reasons, share buybacks are almost always for cash. Selfish
directors do not want to authorize even these, preferring to retain
control over the firm’s money, while faithful directors will authorize
them only if the firm has a healthy equity cushion and the board is
unaware of profitable projects in which to invest its cash.
Finally, merger-linked appraisal rights should also normally
pose no threat to going-concern surplus, although exceptional scenarios
can be imagined. The board must authorize any merger that would
trigger appraisal rights, and there is little reason for it to do so when
the exercise of those rights is likely to disrupt operations or force
liquidation of valuable assets. Again, faithful directors will not
deliberately imperil a going-concern surplus, and self-interested ones
will not put their positions at risk.
The structure of appraisal rights further reduces the likelihood
that their exercise will undermine the merged firm’s going-concern
value. The rights are payable in cash, and the post-merger firm will
normally have multiple options for raising that cash (tapping reserves,
taking on new debt, issuing new shares, etc.). Moreover, shareholders
waive their appraisal rights by voting for a merger, 59 and many mergers
cannot be consummated unless ratified by holders of a majority of
59. Id. tit. 8, § 262(a).
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shares. 60 In combination, these rules place an upper bound on the
number of shares that the post-merger firm could be forced to buy back.
Finally, if the board has reason to fear that shareholders will exercise
their appraisal rights en masse, it can insist on a higher merger price
as a condition of the deal, which will discourage shareholders from
exercising their appraisal rights since by doing so they forgo the merger
consideration they would have otherwise received. 61
For all these reasons, the likelihood that the exercise of mergerlinked appraisal rights will significantly disrupt a corporation’s
operations or force it to sell off valuable assets is exceedingly small.
Such consequences are not unimaginable, but they will occur only when
the board has badly underestimated the level of shareholder discontent
with the merger and yet that level is nonetheless insufficient to cause
holders of a majority of shares to vote against it. Such a “sweet spot”
level of underestimated shareholder dissatisfaction appears to be an
exceedingly rare occurrence. This is not to say that appraisal rights
cannot be costly in other ways: the recent wave of “appraisal arbitrage”
was a nuisance to many firms, imposing transaction costs and in some
cases forcing firms to pay more to shareholders than those shareholders
would have received had they acceded to the merger. 62 But such costs
did not derive from damage to, or inflict damage upon, the sources of
going-concern value.
To this point, I have implicitly assumed a board of directors that
is not dominated by a controlling shareholder. This is a realistic
assumption for publicly traded corporations in the United States, most
of whose shares are widely held. But of course some corporations have
controlling shareholders whose interests with respect to capitalreturning transactions could differ from those of an independent board
or of minority shareholders. The corporate form does not lock in the
capital of controlling shareholders, who can dictate share-buyback and
merger policy to the board, and who typically hold enough shares that
they can unilaterally ratify fundamental transactions such as mergers
and dissolutions.
Yet while controlling shareholders have the power to withdraw
capital in a manner that damages going-concern value, they have little
incentive to do so, since they would bear the lion’s share of the resulting
losses, being the largest residual claimants to that value. Therefore, if
a corporation has a going-concern surplus, its controlling shareholder is
60. Id. tit. 8, § 251(c).
61. See id. tit. 8, § 262(h), (l).
62. See Wei Jiang, Tao Lio & Randall Thomas, The Long Rise and Quick Fall of Appraisal
Arbitrage, 100 B.U. L. REV. 2133, 2144 (2020).
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unlikely to effect a dissolution or merger that would imperil the main
components of that surplus. He would rather cash out the minority
shareholders and keep the firm for himself, an act that might be
opportunistic (the price paid for minority shares might be inadequate)
but that does not reduce the firm’s going-concern value. As for a
buyback of his own shares, the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary
duties to the minority make it difficult for him to cause the corporation
to do this to their exclusion, 63 and if he must include them he has no
reason to buy back shares in a way that imperils going-concern surplus,
since he will, again, be the primary victim.
In sum, we see that the corporation does generally lock in capital
to the extent necessary to protect each of the components of goingconcern value. We now turn to the partnership, where unilateral
withdrawal and payout rights make the analysis of going-concern
protection more complicated.
D. Real Capital Lock-in in the Partnership
Like corporations, partnerships can make periodic distributions
of profits, analogous to dividends. Such distributions typically must be
authorized by a majority of partners, whose financial interests will
normally lead them to approve only those distributions that do not
undermine their firm’s going-concern surplus. Their incentives in this
regard thus parallel those of a majority shareholder. By contrast, an
individual partner might exercise his payout right even if doing so
decreases the firm’s going-concern surplus, since he knows that much
of the resulting loss will be borne by the other partners. Therefore, the
question of interest is whether partnership law circumscribes the
payout right in a manner that prevents its exercise from injuring the
remaining partners through impairment of the various sources of goingconcern value.
1. The Consequences of Partner Withdrawal
Unless the partnership agreement states otherwise, a partner
can obtain a full payout of his capital only if he withdraws from the
partnership. And withdrawal has two additional consequences: it
63. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 593 (Mass.
1975) (holding that shareholders in a close corporation owe each other the same fiduciary duty
that partners owe to one another in a partnership); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719
(Del. 1971) (holding that the parent corporation owes a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary in dealings
between them).
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dissociates the partner from the business, and it dissolves the
partnership itself. This was true in the common-law partnership of the
nineteenth century, and it remains true under the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1997 (“RUPA”), which has been adopted by thirtynine states. 64
“Dissociation” refers to the cessation of a partner’s general
powers and duties with respect to the partnership. A partner who
dissociates loses his general authority to act as the partnership’s
agent, 65 and he can no longer participate in the management and
conduct of the business, except perhaps for purposes of winding it up. 66
He also is no longer generally liable for new partnership debts, 67 nor
must he continue to refrain from competing with the partnership. 68 The
RUPA explicitly uses the term “dissociation” to refer to these
consequences of withdrawal. Withdrawal also has these consequences
under the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (“UPA”), 69 just as it did
under the pre-statutory common law, even though the UPA and most of
the older case law does not explicitly distinguish between dissociation
(a consequence for the partner) and dissolution (a consequence for the
partnership).
The second consequence of a partner’s withdrawal, dissolution,
does not mean what it sounds like. A partnership that dissolves does
not break apart and disappear like a sugar cube dissolving in water.
Rather, it enters into a winding-up period of indefinite length before
reaching its end point, “termination.” 70 For our purposes, the most
important consequence of dissolution is that it gives each partner—

64. To date, the states that have not enacted it are Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina. Most of these remaining states use the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914
(“UPA”).
65. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 603 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997).
66. Id. §§ 603, 802(c).
67. Id. § 703. An exception may apply if the debt was incurred before the partnership finished
winding up and the creditor was not on notice that the partner had withdrawn. Id. § 703(b).
68. Id. § 603(b)(2).
69. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 33 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1914).
70. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 802(a); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 30. Before the enactment of the
RUPA, the winding-up period could be indefinite, meaning that the remaining partners often could
continue operating the business for as long as they wished. See HURT ET AL., supra note 54, at
§ 7.01[b] (observing that, under the UPA, “[it] is . . . more accurate to characterize the partnership
business as continuing indefinitely, unless the partners decide to wind it up, than to regard
winding up of the business as a necessary or even usual consequence of dissolution”). The RUPA,
by contrast, permits a partner to dissociate without thereby causing the partnership’s dissolution.
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601. Given this possibility, the RUPA further specifies that, when
dissolution does occur, the subsequent winding-up activities must be for the sole purpose of
bringing the partnership to termination. Id. § 802(a).
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including the withdrawing one, unless he withdrew wrongfully 71—the
right to demand a sale of the entire business, whole and intact, unless
the partnership agreement states otherwise. 72 As noted earlier, this
right works naturally in conjunction with the payout requirement
because it provides a mechanism for both raising cash and determining
how much of that cash the departing partner is owed. 73 Morgan Ricks
called this the “forced sale” right because it trumps any personal
preference the other partners might have to partition the firm’s
property or employ a different valuation method. 74
The forced-sale right prevents dissolution from automatically
shutting down the partnership’s underlying business. If they wish, the
non-withdrawing partners can bid at the auction for the business and
continue to operate it if they prevail. And they usually will prevail, as
their inside knowledge of the business gives them an advantage in
appraising it. 75 In consequence, the business of a dissolved partnership
can, and often does, continue in the hands of the same owners (minus
one), an option that Ricks showed was available in the nineteenth
century just as it is today. 76
The third consequence of withdrawal is the one that has been
the focus of the scholarship on going-concern protection: the payout
right. Unless the partners have agreed otherwise, the withdrawing
partner is entitled to a payment equal to the value of his partnership
interest. Importantly, the default rule is that this value is payable in
cash rather than through a division and in-kind distribution of
partnership property. This is true both under the RUPA and under the
UPA, which codified the common law. 77

71. Under the RUPA, a partner’s dissociation from a partnership that has not yet completed
an agreed-upon term or specified undertaking does not dissolve the partnership unless a majority
of the remaining partners votes for dissolution. Id. § 801(2)(i).
72. See Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (applying
Wisconsin’s version of the UPA); Ricks, supra note 6, at 1337 (describing the forced-sale right
under nineteenth-century common law).
73. See Dreifuerst, 280 N.W. 2d at 335, 339 (“[A] sale is the best means of determining the
true fair market value of the assets.”).
74. Ricks, supra note 6, at 1339.
75. See ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 489–90 (1968)
(“Theoretically, liquidation [upon dissolution] calls for a sale of partnership property to strangers,
payment of debts, and division of proceeds among the partners. Factually, the most logical buyers
are often the remaining partners.”).
76. See Ricks, supra note 6, at 1337–38; Alan R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution–Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV. 631, 631–32 (1965).
77. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 701(e), 807(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.
1997); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 38(1) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1914); Ricks, supra
note 6, at 1337.
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As the literature on going-concern value and business entities
recognizes, voluntary withdrawal is not the only event that might
separate a partner from his partnership. He might die, an eventuality
emphasized by Blair, 78 or he might become a debtor in bankruptcy, a
risk emphasized by Hansmann and Kraakman. 79 Death naturally
dissociates a partner from the partnership, and it has been established
for more than a century that personal bankruptcy does as well. In either
case, the partner’s estate has the right to a cash payout of his interest. 80
On the other hand, the RUPA provides that a partner’s dissociation by
death or bankruptcy does not dissolve the partnership, 81 the implication
being that his heirs and personal creditors are not entitled to force a
sale of the business. Rather, the partnership must purchase the
dissociated partner’s interest for cash at a price equal to the amount
that would have been distributed if “the assets of the partnership were
sold at a price equal to the greater of the liquidation value or [sic 82] the
value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern without
the dissociated partner.” 83 In other words, under the RUPA the
successors have a right to a cash buyout of the partner’s interest at a
price determined by a hypothetical sale rather than an actual sale. In
this way, the RUPA distinguishes between events of dissociation that
also cause dissolution (voluntary withdrawal, assuming a partnership
at will) and events of dissociation that do not also cause dissolution
(death or personal bankruptcy), with different implications for the
payout right.
The question of buyout versus forced sale in case of a partner’s
death or bankruptcy is murkier under the UPA, which, as noted,
conflates dissolution and dissociation. 84 But courts applying the UPA
have traditionally been reluctant to force a sale on behalf of a partner’s
estate when the remaining partners are opposed; instead, judges have
normally ordered the partnership to purchase the partner’s interest
from his estate, the same approach prescribed by the RUPA. 85 This
78. Blair, supra note 1, at 420.
79. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 390 (“The truly essential aspect of asset
partitioning is, in effect, the reverse of limited liability—namely, the shielding of the assets of the
entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers.”).
80. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 601(7)(i), 701(b); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 31(4), 31(5), 38.
81. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 601(6), 601(7), 801.
82. The term “the greater of” designates a member of a two-member set and therefore cannot
refer to the set “X or Y,” which has only one member, consisting of either of two alternatives.
Compare “John is the taller of two brothers” (makes sense) with “John is the taller of one brother
or the other” (doesn’t sound right). The “or” in this excerpt from the RUPA should be an “and.”
83. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 701(b).
84. HURT ET AL., supra note 54, § 7.11[B][1].
85. See id. § 7.11[F] (collecting cases).
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“forced buyout” approach was evidently something of a twentiethcentury innovation; according to Ricks, nineteenth-century courts
typically ordered a going-concern sale of the partnership business upon
the request of a partner’s estate, at least upon a showing of good cause. 86
2. Protection of Ongoing Operations and Firm-Specific Assets
We will now consider the implications of the three legal
consequences of partner withdrawal—dissociation, dissolution, and
payout—for each of the main components of going-concern value. The
first two components—uninterrupted operations and value from firmspecific assets—generally go together, as piecemeal liquidation directly
threatens both by fragmenting the firm’s property.
A partner’s dissociation need not, in itself, bring the
partnership’s operations to a halt or split up its assets. As noted, the
remaining partners can continue to operate the firm. While the
departing partner’s labor might have been of great value to the firm,
there is nothing entity law can do to retain it, since labor contracts are
not subject to specific performance. 87 In other words, there is no
difference in this regard between a partnership and a corporation,
whose managers similarly might quit at any time.
Dissolution, in turn, also need not interrupt business operations,
because its main implication is that the firm enters a winding-up period
that ends when the firm is sold and the cash proceeds are divided. And
any partner can, as described above, insist that the firm be sold intact.
To be sure, piecemeal liquidation could occur instead, but this will
happen only if all partners agree to it, which they will rationally do only
if the firm lacks a going-concern surplus. (Conversely, if the firm is
insolvent, with debts exceeding the value of its assets, then bankruptcy
law rather than partnership law will probably decide its fate, another
regard in which the partnership is not different from the corporation.)
Finally, the payout right also presents little threat of disruption
or fragmentation, since it is payable in cash at the demand of any
partner, and the remaining partners can employ any available option
for raising that cash. Thus, they might find it in the partnership’s bank
account, or in their own. Or they might arrange for the partnership to
borrow it, or raise it by bringing on a replacement partner. 88 Each of
86. See Ricks, supra note 6, at 1339.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 367 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
88. It might seem that the partnership would have to be fully solvent to raise the needed cash
through borrowing or issuing a new equity interest. But note that the withdrawing investor’s
payout entitlement shrinks as the firm approaches insolvency, as it is a claim on net assets. So the
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these options remains available even if the partner’s withdrawal
triggers a forced sale, because whoever wins the auction (and it may be
the remaining partners) can then decide whether to make the payout
from the partnership’s existing cash balance, from newly raised capital,
or from personal funds. Once again, the remaining partners or their
successors can preserve the business intact if doing so is efficient.
It is important to observe that cash itself can never have firmspecific value and hence that a cash payout right cannot directly
threaten going-concern value derived from firm-specific assets. By
definition, firm-specific assets are unique, whereas cash is the ultimate
commodity, with all units being perfectly fungible. Recall that an
owner’s power to hold up a firm by threatening to withdraw firmspecific assets arises due to the problem of bilateral monopoly, wherein
each party values something that only the other can provide. So, for
example, imagine that a withdrawing partner was able to remove from
his partnership a unique robot worth $100,000 to the partnership but
only $20,000 (its scrap value) to anyone else. Naturally, the partnership
would subsequently want to buy the robot back from the ex-partner for
any price up to $100,000, while the ex-partner would want to sell it back
to the partnership for any price above $20,000. A negotiation would
thus ensue, which, given such a wide bargaining space, might involve
prolonged bargaining, walk-away threats, stonewalling, and so on.
Meanwhile, the partnership will lose operating profits as the robot
lies idle.
If, however, the departing partner is entitled only to remove
cash, there is no resulting bilateral monopoly. From the partnership’s
perspective, the value of the cash in his hands is the same as the value
of an equivalent amount of cash held by anyone else. Therefore, if the
partnership needs to borrow to replenish its cash stores, it will have no
special reason to seek the loan from the ex-partner rather than from
other potential lenders. In the market for cash loans, the market
interest rate is the price and everyone is a price taker. Since the asset
is perfectly fungible, there is no bilateral monopoly, no holdup threat
that will interfere with reassembly of the firm to its original scope, and,
hence, no threat to going-concern value.
To be sure, one can imagine a scenario in which the three legal
consequences of a partner’s withdrawal might present a threat to the
partnership’s particular asset configuration. For example, a
withdrawing partner might threaten to force a sale of the business
burden from the payout right does not increase, at least linearly, as the firm’s degree of solvency
decreases. In this way, withdrawal of equity contrasts with acceleration of a loan, as a lender’s
payment entitlement is fixed and therefore does not adjust in accommodation of the borrower’s
degree of solvency.
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under conditions in which the remaining partners desire to remain in
control of the firm but fear they would be outbid by outsiders at an
auction. 89 The withdrawing partner could then hold up the others for a
cash payment that exceeds the true value of his interest, the payment
representing, in effect, the purchase price of his right to force a sale. In
that scenario, the remaining partners might be willing to sell off some
of their firm’s property to raise the needed cash. Some disruption of
operations, loss of scale economies, or even separation of firm-specific
assets might result. 90
But how realistic is this scenario? Notably, it requires the
remaining partners to fear being outbid at an auction for their firm. Yet
we know that partners are typically in the best position to appraise the
partnership accurately due to their inside knowledge; anyone who
outbids them is likely to suffer buyer’s remorse. Moreover, the
remaining partners would normally have a great deal of flexibility in
how they raise the cash necessary to pay off the partner who is holding
them up. Again, options include drawing on the firm’s cash reserves,
tapping credit lines, and borrowing from new lenders to whom the
partners might offer the partnership’s assets as collateral. In the
unlikely event that no such source is availing, the partners could raise
cash by selling partnership property that lacks firm-specific value, for
which they could obtain a market price. 91
Finally, even if the remaining partners were forced as a last
resort to raise cash by selling property with firm-specific value, they

89. The scenario described requires deliberate withdrawal by the partner rather than
dissociation on account of his death or personal bankruptcy, since his heirs and personal creditors
have no forced-sale power under the RUPA, and their power to insist upon a sale of the firm even
under common law was more limited than that of the partner himself.
90. Hansmann and Kraakman described a somewhat similar holdup scenario. See Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 3, at 403–04:
[A] personal creditor [of an owner] with a right to foreclose on firm assets might well
threaten to exercise that right and destroy substantial going concern value—even if he
could realize little or nothing thereby because the firm lacks sufficient net worth—
simply to hold up the firm (or its owners or creditors) for a sum larger than his claim
on the firm would receive if he actually foreclosed.
In seeming recognition of this hazard, the RUPA denies personal creditors the power to dissolve
the partnership or force a sale; it instead empowers courts to issue a partner’s personal creditor a
charging order against the partner’s transferable interest. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 504 (NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997). On the other hand, if the partner is bankrupt, his
bankruptcy trustee can force the partnership to purchase his interest for cash at a price
determined by a third-party appraiser, a power that introduces a holdup hazard to the extent of
the costs to the partnership of raising the needed cash and the possibility that the appraiser will
overvalue the interest. Id. § 701.
91. To prevent any disruption of production or loss of scale economies, the partnership could
arrange to lease the property back.
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could still preserve that value by insisting that the buyer lease the
property back to the partnership on terms that permitted it to capture
the full associated surplus. And there is no reason to suspect that a deal
on such terms would be difficult to arrange as long as there were
multiple potential buyers of the property and the partnership were
willing to offer the buyer/lessor a normal rate of return on his
investment. Put another way, a forced sale of a firm-specific asset does
not create a bilateral-monopoly problem (as forced partitioning does),
since the partnership can make leaseback a condition of the sale.
Of course, there may be situations in which one partner
withdraws because he wants to force a sale that will enable him to buy
out the others and take the whole business for himself. The famous
California case of Page v. Page appears to have involved such a
scheme. 92 In that situation, however, one partner forces a sale not to
hold up the others but rather to squeeze them out. Control over the
partnership is at stake but its going-concern value is not at risk.
These observations confirm Ricks’s argument that American
partnership law, in both its common-law and statutory manifestations,
provides a significant degree of protection to the firm’s particular asset
configuration when a partner withdraws. Dissociation, dissolution, and
payout, neither individually nor in combination, appear likely to
fragment a partnership’s property or interrupt its operations unless
such consequences would be efficient.
3. Contract Protection Upon Partner Withdrawal
It remains to consider whether any of the legal consequences of
a partner’s withdrawal might threaten going-concern surplus arising
from a partnership’s contracts. It would be natural to assume that a
partnership’s contracts terminate when the partnership does, as a
contract cannot bind a person who has ceased to exist. But this
assumption would be incorrect. At common law, a partnership was not
considered a distinct legal entity, 93 and its partners were thus deemed
to be the real parties to its side of the contract. 94 Therefore, unless the

92. 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
93. HURT ET AL., supra note 54, § 1.03[B].
94. A 1911 treatise explained this principle as follows: “As the law does not recognize the
partnership as a legal entity apart from its members, a partnership as such cannot be a party to a
contract. . . . [T]he contracts of a partnership are the contracts of the individual partners jointly.”
EUGENE ALLEN GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS § 69 (1911).
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contracts explicitly provided otherwise, 95 a partnership’s contracts
survived the partnership itself, since the real parties to them remained
in existence. 96 Notably, this rule meant that the partnership’s contracts
survived not just the partnership’s dissolution but also its termination,
a consequence that effectively prevented partners (or their successors)
from using the threat of withdrawal to hold up the partnership to the
extent of the surplus from those contracts. 97
During the twentieth century, the notion that a partnership is
merely an aggregation of its partners gradually gave way to the view
that it is a distinct legal entity. The UPA shifted the partnership toward
legal-entity status by allowing it to hold property in its own right and
by specifying that partners are agents of the partnership rather than of
each other. 98 And the RUPA seemingly completed the transformation
by declaring that a partnership “is an entity distinct from its
partners.” 99 Such developments might seem to have undercut the
reasoning behind the common-law rule that a partnership’s contracts
survive the partnership’s dissolution and termination. Yet courts have,
95. In this sense, then, partnership law’s treatment of executory contracts is different from
that of bankruptcy law, which, as noted above, disregards ipso facto clauses that purport to
terminate executory contracts when either party files for bankruptcy.
In discussing the problem of asset fragmentation, Morgan Ricks made the intriguing
observation that “organizational law and business bankruptcy law enjoy a deep conceptual
symmetry,” as “organizational law prevents business co-owners from inefficiently dismantling
asset configurations,” while bankruptcy law “prevents business creditors” from doing the same.
Ricks, supra note 6, at 1346. A parallel point can be made with respect to executory contracts:
bankruptcy law protects their value against debt-collection efforts by the firm’s creditors, whereas
partnership law protects their value against efforts by a partner, his heirs, or his personal creditors
to achieve a payout of his partnership interest. In both cases, however, there is an important
difference, as bankruptcy is a mandatory regime, whereas the elements of partnership law that
protect both valuable asset configurations and profitable contracts may be varied freely by
contract.
96. See Asbestos Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Lenning-Rapple Eng’g Co., 146 P. 188, 189 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1914) (“[S]uch dissolution [of a partnership] does not ordinarily absolve third persons
from their contractual obligations to the firm.” (citation omitted)); Horst v. Roehm, 84 F. 565, 568
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1898) (rejecting the notion that “any dissolution of a commercial partnership,
accompanied by a division of its executory contracts, would work their extinguishment,” and
holding that the contractual rights of the partners “continue to be enforceable, though only by
action . . . in the name of all”).
97. If a partner merely dissociates (and perhaps receives a cash payment) but there is no
consequent dissolution of the partnership, the rule again is that the partnership’s contracts are
unaffected unless they provide otherwise. Since the partnership does not terminate, it continues
as a party to its contracts. Indeed, the dissociated partner’s liability on those contracts also
continues unless the counterparty agrees to release him; dissociation removes his liability for
subsequent partnership obligations but not for past ones. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 703 (NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 36 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L. 1914).
98. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 8–9.
99. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 201(a).

1814

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1787

once again, come to the rescue of going-concern value, as they have
preserved the contract-survival rule by applying it to partnerships
governed by the UPA 100 and, in the one recorded decision directly on
point, to a partnership governed by the RUPA. 101 Such holdings can be
interpreted to mean that a partnership’s contracts continue to survive
both its dissolution and its termination, or that the partnership’s postdissolution winding-up period does not end until contractual obligations
in both directions have been fulfilled or discharged by mutual
agreement. Under either interpretation, the cases suggest that judges
continue to be willing to develop and apply default rules that preserve
the components of a partnership’s going-concern value when a partner
withdraws, unless doing so would violate the express terms of the
partnership agreement or the partnership’s contracts with
third parties.
In summary, we see that partnership law has developed rules
that operate to preserve each of the main components of going-concern
value when a partner exercises his right to withdraw and obtain a
payout of his equity capital. Like the corporation, the partnership locks
in the firm’s real capital (its investments in specialized assets and
valuable contractual relationships), even while it differs from the
corporation by permitting individual owners to withdraw their financial
capital. And rather than requiring the business to shut down
immediately when a partner withdraws, partnership law contemplates
a winding-up period during which the whole business can be sold
without interruption of its operations. These conclusions confirm
Hansmann, Kraakman, and Blair in their insight that the protection of
going-concern value is one of the primary functions of the law of
business entities, a function important enough that the partnership and
corporation each developed its own means for fulfilling it.
II. THE TRADEOFFS OF PAYOUT RIGHTS AND FINANCIAL LOCK-IN
Although partnership law has developed rules that protect
going-concern value when a partner exercises his payout right, other
potential costs of that right remain. Most obviously, the partnership
must raise the cash needed to honor the right. And, perhaps more
importantly, an independent valuation method must be employed when
100. See HURT ET AL., supra note 54, at § 7.14[B] nn.19–21 (collecting cases).
101. Larson v. McNichol, No. Civ.A. CV-04-119, 2005 WL 2724179, at *3 (Super. Ct. Me. Mar.
11, 2005). The small number of cases on point might owe to the fact that the RUPA is not that old
and that a sizable minority of states continue to use the UPA. Moreover, careful drafters of
partnership contracts will specify what happens when the partnership dissolves or terminates,
reducing the number of instances in which courts must fall back upon a default rule.
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the partners cannot agree on how much the departing partner’s interest
is worth. Besides being potentially inaccurate, valuation methods can
be employed opportunistically, with the form of the opportunism
depending on the method employed. Given these intrinsic costs of the
payout right, why does partnership law continue to grant it by default
rule, rather than simply locking in capital as the corporation does?
In this part of the Article, I propose an answer to this question.
I argue that payout rights complement two other characteristics of the
partnership: the non-transferability of partner control rights, and the
possibility for partnerships to be formed inadvertently, without each
partner’s intention to convey his capital to a distinct legal entity.
Although both of these characteristics serve valuable functions in the
partnership, they can produce a bilateral-monopoly problem and a
heightened freezeout hazard when not combined with payout rights.
The corporation has neither of the attributes that make payout
rights especially valuable in the partnership. By default rule, corporate
shares are freely transferable, and all control rights appurtenant to
share ownership change hands along with the shares. And, unlike
partnerships, corporations cannot be formed inadvertently; rather,
formation requires a public filing that puts all potential investors on
notice that will be committing their capital to a distinct legal person
which will be under no obligation to return that capital upon demand.
Therefore, the special problems that make payout rights particularly
valuable in the partnership do not arise in the typical corporation.
Meanwhile, the costs of payout rights would be higher in the
corporation: combining payout rights with freely transferable shares
would invite arbitrageurs to acquire shares and then force the
corporation to buy them back solely on the expectation that the shares’
appraisal value will exceed their market price. Such arbitrage would
impose costs on the corporation without, at least in most cases,
generating social benefits. Given these differences with the
partnership, cost-benefit analysis weighs against payout rights in the
corporation, which is why corporate law uses capital lock-in as its
default rule.
A. Non-Transferability of Control Rights: The Problem of Bilateral
Monopoly
The most obvious benefit of the payout right in the partnership
is liquidity: the right gives each partner an option to convert his interest
to cash at any time. As such, however, the right does not generate a net
economic benefit, as its exercise imposes a corresponding liquidity
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(cash-raising) cost on the remaining partners, who must honor the right
either by providing the cash themselves or by submitting to the
liquidation of their own interests in a sale of the partnership. Therefore,
a real economic benefit arises only when gains from trade are possible:
when the continuing partners value the exiting partner’s interest more
than he does, and hence a price exists at which the parties could
mutually benefit from an exchange of that interest for cash. Gains from
trade could arise because a retiring partner does not wish to hold a large
equity stake in a firm that he will no longer have a hand in managing,
or because he has a pressing personal need for cash and the remaining
partners can raise cash more cheaply than he can, such as by borrowing
against the firm’s property.
The mere possibility, however, that a cash buyout of a departing
partner’s interest will generate gains from trade would not justify the
imposition of an obligation on the partnership to purchase that interest.
After all, if both sides would benefit from an exchange, they could agree
to one voluntarily. Rather, to make the case for a payout right—which
is, in effect, a put option that imposes a purchase duty on the
partnership—we must identify a structural impediment that might
hinder a voluntary exchange when a partner wishes to cash out. And
such an impediment does appear to exist in partnership law in its
prohibition on unilateral transfers of full partnership interests. Thus,
the default rule is that each partner may freely assign (by sale or
otherwise) his right to receive distributions. 102 But a partner must
obtain the other partners’ unanimous consent to transfer his control
rights, which include his powers to use partnership property for
business purposes, participate in its management, vote on partnership
decisions, and bind it in contract. 103 To highlight this distinction, the
RUPA refers to the partner’s right to receive distributions as his
“transferable interest,” indicating that the other aspects of his
partnership interest are not freely transferable. 104
The restriction on transfers of partner control rights is a
corollary of the principle that no person can join a partnership without
all partners’ consent. This principle makes sense in light of the powers
that a partner enjoys to use partnership property, participate in its
management, and incur debts for which all partners are jointly and
severally liable. 105 Given such powers, each partner will naturally insist
upon having a say over who else can acquire a full partnership interest.
102. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503.
103. Such a transfer would effectively make the transferee a partner in the firm, and new
partners can be admitted only with the permission of all partners. Id. §§ 503(a)(3), 401(i).
104. Id. § 102(23).
105. Id. § 306(a).
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But the restriction creates a problem when a partner wants to cash out,
because it makes his fellow partners, acting as a group, the only
possible purchasers of his control rights. 106 I say “acting as a group”
because the requirement that all partners consent to a transfer of a full
partnership interest effectively disables the remaining partners from
bidding against each other for the interest of a departing partner.
If a departing partner lacked a payout right, the remaining
partners would have him over a barrel. They could simply refuse to deal
with him, perhaps because of ill will surrounding the circumstances of
his departure. Or, even if the remaining partners were amenable to a
deal, the two sides might have difficulty reaching a mutually agreeable
price due to the bilateral-monopoly problem. Not only would the
remaining partners be the only potential buyers of the withdrawing
partner’s control rights, but in most instances the withdrawing partner
would be the only available seller of such rights, as he normally will be
the only partner at that point wishing to retire or seek work elsewhere.
When a partner is a real person rather than a legal entity, withdrawal
usually means a change of jobs, if not careers; partner withdrawals are
therefore not daily occurrences in most partnerships.
Besides the payout right, another feature of the partnership that
mitigates the bilateral-monopoly problem when a partner wises to cash
out is the free transferability of his right to receive distributions. If his
fellow partners were to stonewall him, a partner who wished to exit
could at least sell this portion of his partnership interest to a third
party. But this right to transfer one’s claim on distributions is not a
complete substitute for the payout right. The power to participate in the
control of a business firm has intrinsic value, a point that is well
understood by scholars of corporate law, who know that shares
constituting a control block sell at a premium to minority shares. Thus,
the holder of the control rights that come with a partnership interest
might derive satisfaction from managing a business and influencing its
strategic direction. And he might enjoy financial benefits as well, the
most obvious of which is protection against freezeout because he, unlike
someone who merely holds cash-flow rights, has a voice in distribution
decisions. It follows that the market price for cash-flow rights bundled
106. Technically, a withdrawing partner does not transfer his control rights to the other
partners; rather, his rights are extinguished. In practice, however, one partner’s dissociation
increases the powers of the remaining partners pro tanto. For example, the withdrawal of one
partner in a four-person partnership increases each remaining partner’s share of the voting and
other management powers from twenty-five percent to thirty-three percent. Therefore, a payout
that a partner receives upon withdrawal includes compensation for the transfer to the remaining
partners of his control rights (along with his cash-flow rights, assuming he has not already
assigned these to someone else).
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with control rights would exceed the market price for those cash-flow
rights (i.e., the transferable interest) alone. It is this pro-rata control
premium that will be the subject of the negotiations characterized by
bilateral monopoly when a partner wishes to depart, because the other
partners are, collectively, the only possible buyers of the control rights
the premium represents. 107
The freezeout hazard that could arise from a partner’s sale of his
transferable interest is an illustration of the general problem that
results from the separation of ownership and control. 108 And this
problem is a further reason that free transferability of cash-flow rights
is not a complete substitute for a payout right. When a partner sells his
transferable interest, his cash-flow rights detach from his control
rights, which could alter how he exercises those control rights. 109 This
partner’s financial incentive is no longer to maximize the value of
distributions; rather, it is to maximize the value of other benefits he can
obtain from the partnership, such as wages (or “guaranteed payments”)
he might charge the partnership for his labor, perquisites (such as a
bigger office), and so on. He also has less incentive to work hard because
107. Under the RUPA, a partnership that is winding up must pay off its debts and then
distribute any remaining property (presumably at this point, cash) ratably among holders of
transferable interests, regardless of whether those interests remain in the hands of the original
partners or have been transferred to third parties. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 806. In other words,
partners who have sold their transferable interests receive no payout at this stage. This does not
mean, however, that the drafters of the RUPA thought that a partner’s control rights lacked
independent economic value. They surely would have known of the reality of corporate control
premiums and the costs of the separation of ownership and control. (Note that, when a corporation
dissolves, the final distribution of value is similarly made among shares ratably regardless of
whether the shares were part of a control block.) There are two more plausible explanation for the
distribution rules in the partnership upon winding up. First, winding up often occurs when the
underlying business is shutting down, in which case control rights are being extinguished. Second,
when dissolution occurs but the business is to continue, the cash used to make the final
distribution will normally have been raised in a sale of the whole firm, intact and for a price
representing the bundled value of all cash-flow rights and control rights in the firm. To then set a
value for control rights shorn of distribution rights would require the employment of a third-party
appraiser, an expense that the drafters of the RUPA presumably believed that the majority of
firms would not want to incur at this stage. As a consequence, the pre-termination market price
for transferable interests will equal the expected present value of distributions in the ordinary
course of business plus a pro rata control premium multiplied by the probability of a change-ofcontrol sale of the firm in the future. By the same logic, the market price of minority shares in a
corporation will reflect the possibility of a future merger or acquisition in which all shares are
purchased and receive the same deal price.
108. Perhaps the most famous discussion of the problems caused by the separation of
ownership and control is found in the 1932 book The Modern Corporation and Private Property by
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. While its focus is the corporation, the problems the book
discusses can arise in any firm in which cash-flow rights and control rights are held by different
parties.
109. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 793–94 (2017) (describing how agents who do not bear
the full costs of their actions might not work as hard and might seek to divert value from investors
to themselves, with a consequent reduction in the overall value of the enterprise).
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he no longer holds a pro rata claim on the fruits of his labors. The
foreseeable consequence of these changes in the partner’s incentives is
a reduction in the value of the business over which he still exercises
control. And that reduction in value will be reflected in the market price
for a transferable interest. 110 By contrast, when a partner with a full
partnership interest exercises his payout right, no separation of
ownership and control results; rather, his bundled control rights and
cash-flow rights are transferred to whomever prevails in the
subsequent sale of the firm. 111 By avoiding the loss of value caused by
separating ownership from control, this bundled transfer should yield a
payout for the partner that exceeds the price he could obtain from a sale
of his cash-flow rights alone.
A final drawback of a sale of a transferable interest is that the
selling partner remains jointly and severally liable for future
partnership debts. 112 And a partner who wishes to retire or otherwise
exit will find this prospect unattractive because he may then feel
compelled to continue to exercise his control rights in order to minimize
his continuing exposure. 113 Dissociation, by contrast, ultimately
extinguishes the partner’s liability for future partnership liabilities
along with his control rights. 114
Interestingly, the fact that partners are jointly and severally
liable for partnership liabilities means that the net value of a
partnership interest will sometimes be negative. This will occur when
the partnership is insolvent, or if the partnership simply has large debts
and the partner has sold his cash-flow rights. But even when the value
of a partnership interest is negative, a bilateral monopoly would still
arise if that partner wished to withdraw but lacked rights to dissociate
and force a sale of the firm. In that situation, the roles of buyer and
110. Although the remaining partners will continue to have productive incentives, they might
be willing to go along with a scheme to cut out the third-party holder of the transferable interest
by, for example, recharacterizing cash distributions to all partners as fees for services rendered.
111. If third-party appraisal rather than an auction is used to value the partnership interest,
the appraiser is supposed to determine the interest’s value based on the appraiser’s estimate of
the amount that a sale of the whole firm would obtain. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 701(b).
112. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503(f).
113. Notably, he will be far more risk-averse when voting on partnership decisions than he
would be if he still had a claim on profits, another potentially value-destroying consequence of a
partner’s sale of his transferable interest.
114. If withdrawal results in dissolution, winding up, and then termination, the former partner
will subsequently have no liability for partnership debts for the simple reason that the partnership
will then no longer exist. If the partner merely dissociates but the partnership continues, the
RUPA provides that the ex-partner has no liability for post-dissociation partnership liabilities
except for those liabilities that (1) arise fewer than two years after his dissociation and (2) are to
claimants that did not know of his dissociation. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 703(b).
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seller would reverse: now, the departing partner would want to buy a
release from his rights and obligations as a partner, but the remaining
partners would again have him over a barrel because they would be the
only possible sellers of that release. The partner’s rights to dissociate
and force a sale enable him to buy a release without the consent of
the other partners for a price equaling his share of the
partnership’s debts. 115
As described earlier, bilateral monopolies can lead to drawn-out
negotiations because neither side can turn to a third party to make a
deal if the other side proves intransigent. Reaching a mutually
acceptable price might be particularly difficult if the bargaining space
is wide, perhaps because, in the case of an exiting partner, he is
desperate for cash and thus willing to sell at a deep discount, and his
copartners know this. The consequent costs of negotiation, delay, and
holdout could be considerable. A right to a cash payout of an amount
determined by an independent valuation method is a mechanism for
breaking the deadlock. Indeed, the mere threat of the right’s exercise
could ease negotiations by narrowing the bargaining space. Whereas
without the right the bargaining space comprises the difference
between the highest price the remaining partners are willing to pay and
the lowest price the departing partner is willing to accept, the payout
right transforms that space into the positive difference, if any, between
the remaining partner’s estimate of the price the independent valuation
would assign to the departing partner’s interest and the departing
partner’s own estimate of that price. Therefore, the parties’ projections
of the valuation price will anchor negotiations, just as projections of a
jury award anchor settlement talks.
To be sure, there will be situations in which the remaining
partners do not in fact value the departing partner’s control rights more
than he does and hence there is no joint surplus to be realized from
exchange. This could occur if the remaining partners have no easy way
to raise cash, perhaps because the partnership property is already
mortgaged. This possibility is perhaps another reason that partnership
law gives each partner—not just the withdrawing one—the option to
demand a sale of the whole firm upon any partner’s withdrawal. This
option relieves each partner of the obligation to pay for the interest of
the one who has withdrawn. Each partner can decline to bid at the sale,
instead using it as an opportunity to cash out his own interest as well.

115. If he has not already sold his transferable interests but the partnership is insolvent, then
he will obtain his release at a price equaling his share of the partnership’s net debts—that is, its
debts minus the proceeds from the sale of the firm, assuming the buyer does not assume those
debts.
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The same bilateral-monopoly problem does not arise when
corporate shareholders wish to liquidate their positions. As noted
earlier, the default rule in the corporation is that all control rights
appurtenant to share ownership are fully transferable along with the
cash-flow rights. Free share transferability is compatible with the
corporate form because shareholders are not agents of the business and
do not enjoy access to its property. All they can do is elect directors,
ratify some fundamental transactions, and exercise appraisal rights in
connection with certain mergers. Therefore, when a shareholder wishes
to sell his control rights, the corporation itself, acting on behalf of the
other shareholders, is not the only party permitted to buy those rights.
In consequence, the same justification for payout rights is absent.
To be clear, my argument is not that situations will never arise
in which a corporate shareholder wished he had a payout right.
Certainly, there will be times when a shareholder wishes to exit his
position but cannot find a third-party buyer willing to pay as much for
his shares as he believes they are worth. The problem of asymmetric
information can arise in any firm, including in those organized as
corporations. And this problem can make outsiders less confident in
their ability to appraise a firm accurately than insiders are. This lack
of confidence will, in turn, translate into a diminished willingness to
pay for an interest in the firm, as it suggests a larger risk premium. A
shareholder wishing to liquidate his position might thus wish he had
the option to force the corporation to buy back his shares for a price
equaling what insiders know is their true value. But asymmetric
information is not a problem particular to firms organized as
corporations: it also arises in firms organized as general partnerships,
and for that matter as limited partnerships, LLPs, and LLCs. In other
words, superior insider knowledge is not a problem produced by the
choice to organize a firm as a partnership rather than a corporation,
and it therefore does not help us understand why partnership law
grants payout rights as a default rule but corporate law does not. While
payout rights for shareholders would certainly generate gains from
exchange in some situations, the drafters of corporate statutes
evidently believe that such gains would not, at least in the majority of
corporations, outweigh the costs of such rights.
B. Partnership Formation and the Hazard of Involuntary Lock-In
I have noted the possibility that, in the absence of payout rights,
partners might stonewall one of their copartners who wished to cash
out, offering him nothing for his interest even if an economic surplus
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could be realized from their buying it. Such stonewalling could be
understood as a specific example of the more general hazard of
freezeout, which occurs when those who control a firm refuse to
distribute cash to non-controlling equityholders, and those
equityholders cannot find third-party buyers willing to pay a price for
their interests that approximates the interests’ pro rata share of the
firm’s projected profits. One reason that the sale of a full ownership
interest to a third party might be impossible is that, as in most
partnerships, the organizational rules simply forbid it. Even, however,
when equityholders have the right to transfer their full interests, they
might be unable to exercise that right if would-be buyers fear that the
firm’s controllers would deny them distributions indefinitely. This form
of freezeout is well known in corporate law, arising especially in closely
held corporations. 116 Indeed, it is a foreseeable hazard, and anyone who
voluntarily acquires corporate shares is on notice of it and can adjust
for it, such as by applying a discount to the price they offer for the
shares or insisting as a condition of the purchase that the charter be
amended to provide for payout rights.
By contrast, a business owner can become a partner in a
partnership, thereby effectively exchanging his investment in the
business for a partnership interest, without intending to do so. As
provided in the RUPA, a partnership comes into existence when two or
more persons associate “to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit . . . , whether or not the persons intended to form a
partnership.” 117 The law’s recognition of unintentional partnerships
protects third parties (through joint and several partner liability for the
business’s debts) and, sometimes, the business owners themselves
(such as by authorizing acts of contribution). 118 But the recognition of
unintended partnerships would be unduly harsh if the resulting entities
locked in financial capital like corporation do. No legitimate interest
would be protected by a rule that enabled controlling owners of a
business to tie up a co-owner’s capital indefinitely even though that coowner neither agreed to grant them that power nor indeed was aware
that he had conveyed his capital to a distinct legal entity. 119 The payout
right thus makes sense as a default rule in the partnership, as freezeout
116. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
117. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a).
118. HURT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2.04[C].
119. My logic here might seem inconsistent with the general principle that each person is
assumed to know the law, including, one might argue, the law of partnership formation. But the
evident purpose of the rules of inadvertent partnership formation is to protect parties who lack
legal sophistication but have acted in good faith, not to reward parties who have set a trap for the
unwary. See, e.g., Vohland v. Sweet, 433 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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can then occur only when a business’s owners have knowingly assumed
freezeout risk, such as by agreeing to a partnership for a term. Put
another way, partnership law reflects the common-sense notion that, if
a firm’s owners desire the power to freeze each other out, they should
have to bargain for it expressly.
One could argue that the distinction drawn here between
deliberate and inadvertent investment in a distinct legal entity proves
too much, as people also sometimes acquire shares in a corporation
unintentionally, such as by inheritance. Perhaps such “involuntary”
shareholders should similarly be able to force the corporation to buy
back their shares. But inherited shares will always be traceable to an
investor who acquired them voluntarily and thus had the opportunity
to discount for freezeout risk. And that discount will have left this
voluntary shareholder with more wealth to leave to his heirs in other
forms. Therefore, a grant of payout rights to those heirs would
constitute a windfall, as it would leave them with an inheritance that
exceeded the value of the devisor’s property in his own hands. And this
windfall would come at the expense of the other shareholders of the
corporation, who would have to bear the costs of the payout
rights’ exercise. 120
C. The Costs of Payout Rights: Cash-Raising Costs, Valuation Risk,
and Opportunism
Not only would cash payout rights provide fewer benefits in the
corporation than they do in the partnership, but they would also
generate higher costs. To see why, I will first describe the general costs
of cash payout rights, and I will then describe why the free
transferability of corporate shares would make such rights more
burdensome to the typical corporation than they are to the
typical partnership. 121

120. A better case for a court’s granting of payout rights to minority shareholders would be to
remedy a situation in which the freezeout hazard was unforeseeable even to the corporation’s
initial investors, perhaps because shares were to be widely held and conditions were such that a
control bloc was unlikely to form. The famous Massachusetts case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc., in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
controlling shareholders could not cause the corporation to buy back their shares unless it offered
to buy out minority shareholders at the same price, appears to have involved such facts. 328 N.E.2d
at 519–21.
121. By specifying cash payout rights, I am assuming that payout rights for shareholders
would be circumscribed by the same rules that the partnership employs to prevent the exercise of
such rights from threating going-concern value.
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The most obvious cost of the cash payout right is that it forces
the firm to come up with cash to honor it. The firm will have to draw
down on its cash reserves, borrow, raise funds from the remaining
owners, or bring on new equity investors. Besides generating
transaction costs, these means for raising cash can impose risk-bearing
costs (if the remaining owners are forced to invest more of their own
funds) or search costs (if new investors must be brought in).
The second main category of cost generated by cash payout
rights arises from the valuation problem. Some method must be
employed for assigning a value to the departing owner’s interest if the
parties cannot agree on one. As described earlier, the traditional
valuation method in the partnership is a sale of the whole firm by
auction. In theory, this method has the benefit of accuracy because
bidders at an auction bear the costs of misvaluation (overbidders suffer
a real loss while underbidders, assuming they do not prevail at the
auction, suffer an opportunity cost) and therefore have an incentive to
appraise the item for sale accurately. Yet valuation through sale of a
whole business also imposes significant burdens. The general
transaction costs of both preparing for a whole-firm auction (such as the
costs of lining up financing) and then conducting the auction could be
substantial. Moreover, a sale results not just in valuation of the
departing owner’s interest but also in the potential transfer of all
interests to new owners, an unappealing prospect if the remaining
owners do not want to lose control.
To prevent the loss of their ownership interests in a forced sale,
the non-withdrawing owners could form a coalition and bid on the firm
collectively. Indeed, we can assume that this is often what happens in
partnerships. But coordination problems could afflict the coalition if it
is large and there are internal disagreements over the firm’s value.
Moreover, the presence of an informed coalition at an auction will chill
bidding because outsiders will rationally fear that they can prevail only
by overpaying. The auction may then close at a depressed price. The
only party willing to bid against this coalition in order to ensure a fair
closing price might be the departing owner, who might also possess
insider knowledge. But an owner seeking to cash out his interest might
be doing so precisely because he is cash-strapped, a condition that will
disable him from bidding to defeat a conspiracy to acquire the firm on
the cheap. 122 We see that a going-concern sale does not guarantee an
accurate valuation after all.
122. Perhaps the partner could borrow the cash he needs for bidding purposes, but the
information-asymmetry problem will make outsiders leery of the only collateral he can offer—that
is, the firm itself if he prevails at the auction. (If he had other good collateral then he would not be
illiquid, since he could borrow against it instead.)
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A further problem with the sale of a business upon one owner’s
withdrawal is that it invites squeeze-out. Periodically, a co-owner of a
business may find himself illiquid in his personal finances. If his fellow
owners were to discover that he has fallen into this state, they might
then be tempted to exercise their withdrawal rights to force a sale of
the business so that they can buy him out at a depressed price. 123 In
this way, the forced sale presents an opportunism hazard that will
make it an unappealing valuation method to many firms.
The other main independent valuation method is third-party
appraisal, now effectively prescribed by the RUPA when a partner
dissociates on account of death or personal bankruptcy rather than
voluntary withdrawal. Independent appraisal is procedurally simpler
than a forced sale, especially if the firm is large. Rather than requiring
the remaining owners to organize a competitive auction and line up
financing to bid, third-party appraisal merely requires them to submit
their proposed valuation to the appraiser. Moreover, less is riding on
the outcome, as the remaining owners do not face the prospect of losing
their ownership stakes as they do in a forced sale if personal illiquidity
prevents them from bidding competitively at the auction. Still, the
method is not costless, as each party might need to hire an expert to
prepare a valuation proposal for submission to the appraiser—who, if
an arbitrator rather than a judge, will also have to be paid.
Third-party appraisal also presents inaccuracy and opportunism
hazards, although in both cases of different natures than those
presented by an auction of the whole firm. The method’s evident
advantage in terms of accuracy is that it cannot be distorted by a
shortage of informed potential buyers, as an auction can be. But the
appraiser’s lack of “skin in the game” is also a disadvantage because he
has no direct financial incentive to arrive at the right answer. And the
same problem of information asymmetry that would discourage
outsiders from bidding at an auction will also hamper an appraiser
chosen precisely because he is an outsider and thus disinterested.
Interestingly, information asymmetry has different implications for
third-party appraisal than for an auction, because unlike a bidder the
appraiser suffers no direct loss if he overvalues rather than
undervalues the firm. Therefore, rather than producing systematic
discounting, information asymmetry should produce errors distributed

123. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q.
357, 385–86 (1987) (describing the squeeze-out problem that arises when some owners are illiquid
and cannot demonstrate to potential lenders their firm’s true value).
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symmetrically around the firm’s true value. From an ex ante
perspective, the firm’s owners may prefer this.
As we have seen recently in the context of corporate mergers, a
payout right whose value is determined by a third party has the further
disadvantage of encouraging arbitrage when ownership interests are
freely transferable. If investors have reason to suspect that the
appraiser will assign a higher price to those interests than the market
does, they might buy interests solely for the purpose of immediately
forcing the firm to cash them out. 124 Such arbitrage could impose
significant cash-raising costs on the firm without generating an
offsetting social benefit. Certainly no benefit will be realized if the
arbitrage occurs because the appraiser overvalues the firm (rather than
because the market undervalues it), a significant risk given that the
appraiser lacks the direct incentive possessed by market investors to
valuate the firm accurately. 125
This discussion indicates that there is no perfect valuation
method: auction and third-party appraisal both entail transaction costs
along with hazards of inaccuracy and opportunism. Regardless,
however, of which method is chosen, we know that its total costs will
rise with the frequency with which payout rights are exercised. It is
thus unsurprising that both the corporation and the partnership limit
those rights, albeit in different ways. The corporation does so by
granting payout rights only in connection with some mergers, offering
full share transferability as the substitute source of liquidity in other
circumstances. And the partnership does so by denying payout rights to
mere assignees of a partner’s right to distributions; 126 rather, payout
rights are available only to investors who have been accepted into the
124. The firm could mitigate this problem by denying payout rights to investors who acquired
their interests only recently. Such a rule would surely discourage professional arbitragers, but it
would not prevent arbitrage by current investors, who could work in the reverse order by first
forcing the firm to cash out their interests at the appraisal price and then restoring their positions
by buying new interests at the market price.
125. In the merger appraisal case of DFC Global Corp. v. Muirford Value Partners, L.P., the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the deal price in a merger was a strong indicator of the target
firm’s fair value because it resulted from a process in which, among other factors, “many parties
with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to bid.” 172 A.3d 346, 349 (Del. 2017). The holding
thus discourages the Delaware Chancery Court from second-guessing a price reached through a
bidding process in which the bidders have a direct financial incentive to appraise the firm for sale
accurately.
126. The RUPA specifies that the “only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is
the partner’s share of the profits and losses of the partnership and the partner’s right to receive
distributions.” REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 502 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997).
A partner’s assignment of his transferable interest is not an act of dissociation and thus does not
compel the partnership to purchase his interest. Id. §§ 601, 701. On the other hand, a transferee
may seek dissolution of the partnership by court order, which the statute directs courts to issue
upon a determination that “it is equitable to wind up the partnership business.” Id. § 801(6).
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firm as partners. This constraint in the partnership naturally reduces
the frequency with which payout rights are exercised and hence the
total cash-raising and other costs that will be generated.
Not only does free transferability of shares in a corporation serve
as a liquidity substitute for general shareholder payout rights, but it
also would greatly increase the costs of such rights if they were granted.
Free transferability would render unworkable the forced-sale option for
valuating shares when payout rights were exercised, as anyone hoping
to acquire control of the firm could buy just one share and then exercise
the payout right to force a sale. Many public corporations would be
continually on the auction block, and the hold-up hazard—whereby
shareholders demanded side payments from managers desiring to hold
onto their jobs—would be considerable. And valuation by third-party
appraisal would also be too frequent to be cost-justified due to
transaction costs and the hazard of appraisal arbitrage. Put simply,
many corporations would be besieged by shareholders demanding
payouts. It therefore makes sense for the corporation to employ a rule
of capital lock-in that limits payout rights to dissolution and certain
mergers, events over which the board of directors has control.
One might argue that allowing any shareholder to force a sale of
a corporation at any time could have the advantage of allowing for the
quick removal of poorly performing managers, thereby lowering agent
costs—the costs from self-seeking conduct and incompetence when
managers rather than investors control a firm. 127 Notably, such agent
costs are generally higher in the corporation than in the partnership,
owing to the separation in the corporation of control rights (held
primarily by the board) from cash-flow rights (held by shareholders). 128
If, however, the payout right were a cost-justified method for curbing
the costs of managerial incompetence and misconduct, we should be
more likely to see it in the corporation than in the partnership, whereas
we actually observe the reverse. Therefore, we can infer that the
drafters of general incorporation statutes and of most corporate
charters believe that the additional principal costs—the costs generated
when investors exercise control of a firm—would exceed the avoided
agent costs if any shareholder could force the sale of a corporation at
any time. 129 Such principal costs would include disruption of operations,
the high transaction costs of endless auctions, and the costs of holdup.

127. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 109, at 767.
128. Id. at 772.
129. Id. at 784 (defining principal costs).
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D. Payout Rights in the Hybrids: The Limited Partnership, LLC, and
LLP
I have argued that two distinctive attributes of the partnership
explain why it, unlike the corporation, gives its equityholders payout
rights by default rule: its restrictions on transfers of owner control
rights and the possibility of inadvertent partnerships. If my argument
is correct, it raises the question whether the presence of both of these
attributes in a business form is necessary to make payout rights
preferable to financial capital lock-in as the organizational default
setting, or whether the presence of either alone would be sufficient.
History does not appear to give us an example of a business form
that could be formed inadvertently but that made control rights fully
transferable. Therefore, we could only speculate about whether such a
form would feature payout rights or financial capital lock-in as its
default rule. But we do have several real examples of the converse:
business forms that restrict transfers of owner control rights yet require
a public filing and hence cannot be formed inadvertently. Indeed, all
three of the modern, limited-liability alternatives to the corporation—
the limited partnership, the LLC, and the LLP—follow this pattern.
Each is thus a hybrid with respect to the attributes of the traditional
partnership that, in my view, explain why it grants payout rights by
default rule. So the question becomes, do these hybrids also grant
payout rights by default rule? If the answer is yes, the implication is
that, at least in the opinion of the drafters of the forms’ respective
governing statutes, non-transferability of owner control is sufficient to
justify payout rights. But if the answer is no, the implication is that the
possibility of inadvertent entity formation is also needed to justify
payout rights as a business form’s default setting.
Although the relevant statutes vary, both across forms and over
time, when considered as a whole they suggest that restrictions on
transfers of control rights are normally sufficient to make payout rights
preferable in the majority of businesses that wish to utilize the form,
justifying such rights as a majoritarian default rule. Only in recent
years, when all three forms became generally available to the point that
they largely overlapped in terms of what they offered business
organizers, have the drafters of their governing statutes sought to
differentiate them by changing the default settings in the limited
partnership and LLC to one of financial capital lock-in, while leaving
payout rights as the norm in the LLP. In effect, the most recent statutes
for the limited partnership and LLC supply default rules meant to
appeal not to the majority of all firms seeking a limited-liability
alternative to the corporation, but rather to just a majority of the subset
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of those firms that also would, for whatever reason, prefer not to
organize as an LLP.
To see this pattern emerge, we begin with the limited
partnership, the oldest of the three arrangements. Medieval in origin, 130
the limited partnership has been authorized by statute in most U.S.
states since the nineteenth century. 131 Desire for harmonization led the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (I will
call them the “Uniform Law Commissioners”) to promulgate the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act in 1916. Its successor, the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act of 1976, remains in force (as amended in 1985)
in a majority of states today. The 1916 and 1976 acts are essentially the
same in terms of the organizational features that interest us here.
Naturally, both require public registration, 132 an evidently universal
feature of statutes authorizing business entities with at least one
limited-liability equity investor. Both acts also grant certain control
rights to limited partners, including rights to veto the admission of new
partners (general or limited), 133 to inspect the firm’s books and records
and demand an accounting, 134 and to apply for dissolution and winding
up by court decree. 135 Paralleling the normal rule for general partners,
the two acts make limited partners’ cash-flow rights freely transferable,
but not their control rights. 136 Finally, both statutes give limited
partners a cash-only payout right for the fair value of their interests,
payable on six months’ notice. 137 Evidently, the Uniform Law
Commissioners thought that the restrictions on transfers of limitedpartner control rights were sufficient to make payout rights preferable
to capital lock-in for the majority of firms that would choose to organize
as limited partnerships, justifying such rights as the statutory
default setting.
130. Hansmann et al., supra note 39, at 1372.
131. The first state to authorize the limited partnership by statute was Louisiana in 1808. The
arrangement is there called the partnership in commendam, the initial rules for which the
Louisiana legislature derived from the French Code of Commerce, which called it the societé en
commandite. Nicolai Von Kreisler, The Partnership in Commendam: Tax Consequences and
Business Risks, 36 LA. L. REV. 260, 260–61 (1975). The first American common-law jurisdiction to
authorize the limited partnership by statute was New York in 1822. Act of Apr. 17, 1822, ch. 244,
1822 N.Y. Laws ch. 259.
132. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 201(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1976)
[hereinafter UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1976]; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 2 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L. 1916) [hereinafter UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1916].
133. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1976 §§ 301, 401; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1916 § 9.
134. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1976 § 305; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1916 § 10.
135. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1976 §§ 802, 803; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1916 § 10.
136. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1976 §§ 701, 702; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1916 §§ 18, 19.
137. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1976 §§ 603–05; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 1916 § 16(b)-(c).
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The next limited-liability entity to appear on the scene was the
LLC. Although it was first authorized by Wyoming in 1977, 138 the LLC
did not become a major competitor to the limited partnership until the
1990s and in particular until promulgation of the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act of 1994. 139 The LLC proved to be more attractive
to most firms than the limited partnership because it granted limited
liability to all equity investors (in the LLC called “members”) 140 and
allowed them to participate in management without thereby forfeiting
their liability shields. 141
Naturally, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 1994
conditions formation of an LLC on a public filing. 142 Except for this
requirement and its rule of limited liability, the entity contemplated by
the 1994 act is partnership-like in structure. Thus, it is an at-will
arrangement unless the members agree to a term. 143 Members’ cashflow rights are freely transferable but their control rights are not. 144
Finally, members enjoy payout rights, 145 again suggesting that the nontransferability of owner control rights was considered sufficient to
justify such rights as the organizational default rule.
At virtually the same time that the LLC became widely
available, the third unincorporated, limited-liability option for modern
businesses appeared: the LLP. Like the LLC, the LLP provides limited
liability to all equity investors, dispensing with the limited
partnership’s requirement that there be at least one “general” partner.
However, the first few LLP statutes offered only a “partial shield,”
meaning that each partner lacked personal liability for the negligence
of other partners but was fully on the hook for the partnership’s
contractual obligations. 146 Yet matters soon changed in this regard, and
in 1997 the Uniform Law Commissioners added an article to the RUPA
138. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (repealed 2010) (originally enacted 1977).
139. Although neither Delaware nor New York adopted this act, they did enact their own LLC
statutes at about the same time. Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6
§ 18-1102 (2021) (originally enacted 1992); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 101 (McKinney 2021)
(originally enacted 1994).
140. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 303 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1996).
141. Id. §§ 301, 302.
142. Id. § 202.
143. Id. § 203(a)(5), and comments thereto.
144. More specifically, the default rule is that a member’s “distributional interest” is freely
transferable, but the transferee does not become a member unless authorized by the operating
agreement or all members consent. Id. §§ 501–03.
145. Members can dissociate at any time, and if the LLC is an at-will arrangement it must
then purchase the member’s interest for cash. Id. §§ 602(a), 603(a)(1).
146. See CARTER BISHOP & DANIEL KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND
BUSINESS LAW ¶ 15.02[3][e][ii] (Nov. 2021) (“The first LLP statutes provide only a partial shield,
covering tort but not contract claims.”).
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authorizing “full shield” LLPs, in which partners have the same degree
of limited liability that is enjoyed by corporate shareholders.
The RUPA as amended in 1997 provides that an LLP can be
formed only upon the filing of a “statement of qualification” with a
designated public authority. 147 In virtually all other material respects,
LLPs authorized by the RUPA are governed by the same rules that the
act applies to partnerships without limited partners. Thus, regardless
of whether a partner is general or limited, his right to receive
distributions is freely transferable but his control rights are not. And
both general partners and limited partners possess cash payout rights.
Over thirty states and territories have adopted these 1997 amendments
to the RUPA, making the full-shield LLP the version in use in the
majority of U.S. jurisdictions. 148
Like the LLC, the full-shield LLP has proven to be more
attractive than the limited partnership for most firms because it confers
limited liability on all partners. Recognizing that the traditional limited
partnership had lost much of its competitive appeal, the Uniform Law
Commissioners decided to overhaul it, promulgating a new Uniform
Limited Partnership Act in 2001. As the official commentary to that act
explains, the revamped limited partnership is tailored to the needs of
two types of enterprise: “sophisticated, manager-entrenched
commercial deals whose participants commit for the long term” and
“estate planning arrangements.” 149 The Uniform Law Commissioners
assumed that the organizers of both types of enterprise would prefer
not just “strong centralized management” but also “passive investors
with little control over or right to exit the entity.” 150 Accordingly, the
2001 act eliminates payout rights for both general and limited
partners. 151 To date, the act has been adopted by twenty-one states,
meaning that limited partnerships continue to assume their traditional
form in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.
Even in states that adopted the new, specialized form of the
limited partnership, the field of partnership-like forms with limited
equityholder liability remained crowded. In particular, the many
147. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 1001 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997).
148. In several states—including California and New York—the LLP can be used only by a
partnership of professionals such as lawyers, architects, or accountants. See THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE
& ELIZABETH G. HESTER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS § 8, 5 STATE
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY & PARTNERSHIP LAWS (Aspen 2008).
149. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT Prefatory Note (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2001).
150. Id.
151. Id. §§ 504, 601, 603. Other changes that make this new limited partnership more
corporate-like include perpetual duration (section 104(c)), and permission for limited partners to
participate in management without losing their liability shield (section 303).
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partnership-like features of the LLC made the arrangement largely
redundant in jurisdictions that had also authorized full-shield LLPs.
Therefore, the Uniform Law Commissioners once again rolled up their
sleeves, and in 2006 they produced a new uniform act for the LLC. So
far, this act has been adopted by 20 U.S. jurisdictions. 152 To better
differentiate the LLC from the LLP, the 2006 act makes the LLC more
like the corporation in several structural particulars. For example, it
changes the default rule on continuity: whereas previously the LLC was
an at-will arrangement, it would now have “perpetual duration.” 153
And, in harmony with this change, the 2006 act replaces the payout
right with a lock-in rule: members can now obtain a capital payout of
the their full interests only if the company is dissolved and wound up
unless the LLC agreement provides otherwise. 154 Business owners who
desire limited liability but not all of the mandatory features of the
corporation (such as merger-linked appraisal rights) can now opt for
capital lock-in in perpetuity by forming an LLC, or for payout rights by
forming an LLP, in either case without the necessity of varying the
organizational default settings.
CONCLUSION
In her famous 2003 article Locking in Capital: What Corporate
Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century,
Margaret Blair described the historical importance of the business
corporation’s rule of capital lock-in, whereby shareholders can obtain a
payout of their capital only with the permission of the board of directors.
Blair described how lock-in of shareholder capital protects the firm’s
going-concern value by preventing inopportune liquidation or
partitioning of firm assets.
In contrast with the corporation, the partnership grants each
partner the right to obtain a payout of his capital at any time unless the
partners have agreed otherwise. Yet firms organized as partnerships
presumably also have going-concern value worth protecting. If this
presumption is correct, two inferences follow. First, the partnership
must employ alternative means for protecting going-concern value
when a partner wishes to exit the arrangement and withdraw his
152. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2006).
153. Id. § 104(c).
154. Id. § 404. Essentially the same rule is found in the LLC statute on the books in Delaware,
which many business organizers now select as the state of organization for their LLC. Although
Delaware’s statute provides for a distribution to members upon resignation, it further specifies
that members may not resign before the dissolution and winding of the company, an event that
requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-603, 18604, 18-801 (2021).
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WHY THE CORPORATION LOCKS IN FINANCIAL CAPITAL
BUT THE PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT
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capital. And second, there must be good reasons for the partnership to
employ these alternative means rather than simply locking in capital
as the corporation does.
I have argued in this Article that both inferences are correct. As
for the first, partnership law employs safeguards that prevent
disruption of the firm’s operations, fragmentation of its assets, and
cancellation of its profitable contracts when a partner withdraws and
exercises his payout right. As Morgan Ricks has shown, partnership law
requires that a withdrawing partner be paid in cash, and it allows any
partner to demand a sale of the whole firm when a partner withdraws.
In combination, these rules allow the underlying business to continue
without disruption of its operations or fragmentation of its property
even when the partnership itself formally dissolves. I have shown that
partnership law also provides for the firm’s contracts to survive
withdrawal of a partner even if the partnership itself consequently
dissolves and is terminated, unless the contracts provide otherwise. In
these ways, partnership law preserves each of the main components of
going-concern value when a partner cashes out. It therefore can be said
that partnership law locks in the firm’s real capital—its investments in
specialized assets and profitable contractual relationships—even while
allowing departing partners to withdraw their financial capital.
As for the second inference, this Article has advanced the thesis
that the partnership has two distinctive attributes that make payout
rights more valuable than they would be in the corporation. One of
these is partnership law’s prohibition on unilateral transfers of full
partnership interests. Because the holder of a partnership interest
possesses important control rights, including powers to manage the
business, use its property, bind it in contract, and incur debts for which
all partners are answerable, this restriction is necessary to ensure that
each partner has the power to determine who can act on his behalf. But
the restriction can create a bilateral-monopoly problem when a partner
wishes to exit, as the other partners are, collectively, the only possible
buyers of his control rights. The payout right solves the bilateralmonopoly problem by compelling the remaining partners to acquire
those control rights at a price determined by an independent valuation
method, which traditionally takes the form of an auction of the
whole firm.
In the corporation, by contrast, the default rule is that the full
bundle of rights that come with share ownership, comprising both cashflow rights and control rights, are freely transferable. Free
transferability of shares eliminates the bilateral-monopoly problem
when a shareholder wises to liquidate his position because the
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corporation is not the only potential buyer of those shares. At the same
time, free share transferability would make payout rights more
expensive to administer than they are in the partnership, as
arbitrageurs could acquire shares solely for the purpose of forcing the
corporation to buy back the shares whenever the arbitrageurs
suspected that the shares’ appraisal value would exceed their market
price. Such arbitrage would impose costs on the corporation while
serving no positive economic purpose. The implication is that payout
rights and free transferability of control rights are mutually
incompatible means for enabling equity investors to liquidate their
positions. It is therefore unsurprising that we do not see business forms
that provide both as a matter of default rule.
The second distinctive attribute of the partnership is that it can
be formed unintentionally. While this rule protects third parties who
reasonably assume that each owner of a business stands behind its
debts, and also protects co-owners who reasonably assume that they can
seek contribution from the others, it would create an unexpected
freezeout hazard if it meant that each co-owner could be denied access
to his financial capital even though he never knowingly conveyed his
capital to a distinct legal entity. The payout right in the partnership
thus reflects the common-sense proposition that persons can be deemed
to have surrendered their right to realize the cash value of their
property only when they have intended to do so. Corporations, by
contrast, cannot be formed inadvertently, and anyone who purchases
shares is on notice that a freezeout problem may arise if he cannot
easily find a buyer for them.
Even, however, when a distinct legal entity can only be formed
through the formality of a public filing—thereby ruling out inadvertent
formation—the essential tradeoff between payout rights and free
transferability of control rights arises, suggesting that organizers of
most business firms will want its owners to have one source of liquidity
or the other, but not both. Thus, in the LLP, where partner control
rights are non-transferable, we find payout rights as the default rule.
The limited partnership traditionally provided payout rights as well,
and it continues to do so in the majority of states. Finally, payout rights
were initially provided as a matter of default rule in the LLC, but
subsequent overlap with the LLP led statute writers to revamp the LLC
to make it more appealing to the set of firms that desire a corporatelike structure but not all the mandatory rules that come
with incorporation.

